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CPSU Urged To Return to Emphasis on Class Struggle

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[Article by Yu. Belov, secretary of the Leningrad Oblast party committee and member of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee: "From the Class Standpoint"]

[Text] The romanticism of perestroika has given way to its harsh reality. And it is such today that we need to recognize that, as in October 1917 also, contending forces have determined their positions, and there's no escaping the question: Who will win? Like then also, society is confronted with a choice not exempt from the need to view the state of affairs from the class standpoint, which is being assiduously concealed behind talk about democracy in general, the state in general, and rights of the individual in general.

Yes, class struggle is returning to us. There are no proletariat and bourgeoisie customary for our historical memory, but they will emerge as soon as the principle "from each according to his capabilities, to each according to his labor" is rejected. Declared, but not implemented in practice by bureaucratized socialism, the principle has been discredited to the utmost in the perestroika years by the champions of "pure" economics and "pure" democracy. A real danger of the establishment of the domination of bourgeois law and legalization of the possibility of some persons living at the expense of others has arisen.

The reality of this possibility has as yet been perceived by far from everyone in our society. And, truly, it is hard to believe that your neighbor, who has previously lived more than comfortably, evoking in some envy, and in the majority of honest workers, scorn, will tomorrow suggest that you work for him for wages. He would pay well, until he found more profitable manpower. But when he had, well...

The class struggle is becoming increasingly obvious even in parliamentary skirmishes. Having become a real social fact, it is being decided here in peaceful forms, primarily in the sphere of law. The latter, as is known, is one of three forms of economic appropriation (capital, money, law). It is for this reason that battles are erupting over each word of the bills that are being discussed. For a long time now, by the modern time count, when a month is equal to a year, members of parliament have been demonstrating more and more often at the microphone not a pluralism of opinions but an outright war of ideas. However those presiding try to observe parliamentary decorum, this can no longer be concealed. It is not, naturally, a question of all members of parliament but of those representing polar-opposite political forces. The MDG [Interregional Group of Deputies] and the "Soyuz" group of deputies, for example.

In a number of regions, primarily in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, class struggle is on the brink of transition to nonpeaceful forms. It is finally time to recognize that civil war, the threat of which the majority of society has recognized, is inconceivable outside of class struggle. Let those wishing to take issue with this cite just one of the civil wars that have occurred in world history that has been free of a struggle of classes. A reluctance to recognize what history teaches is political cowardice. It always costs society dear. It is ultimately a matter of indifference to the masses how fatal political mistakes are made—by design or out of ignorance and naivete. They pay for them in blood.

The class struggle is perfectly recognizable to the political adversaries of the CPSU (we will not confuse them with opponents) and is not yet recognizable in the ruling party, although it is no longer the ruling party everywhere. This loss of a sense of political reality and vigilance is dangerous. I foresee the outbursts of indignation: "That notorious vigilance!"

Distortion of the meaning of concepts is not a reason for abandoning them. A loss of political vigilance, in other words, an ability to see the alignment of political (class) forces, resulted for the party in the past in tragedy—substitution for socialist revolutionary-mindedness of petty bourgeois revolutionism. It is the latter that contains the essence of Stalinism as the practice of political recklessness with its inevitable derivatives—mass terror in respect to one's political adversaries (in the party primarily) and the disfiguring of social life per the arbitrary rule of a blighted consciousness. Only the social creativity of the masses that kept faith in the socialist ideal was the barrier to it.

The evolution of Stalin's petty bourgeois revolutionism to the avowed Brezhnev bourgeois-mindedness in the lifestyle of certain groups of the party elite is still to be investigated. However paradoxical it might seem, the consummation of the above-mentioned evolution were, for the most part, the leaders of the present-day opposition to the CPSU. Many of them are not concealing their aspiration to power in the name of the political legalization of the capital that is springing up and the new clan of exploiters, which is still remaining in the background.

Here we have Gavriil Kharitonovich Popov writing a "What Is To Be Done?" program, postulating therein the need for denationalization, desovietization and defederalization. Mystifying the loss of trust in the "democrats" with the intrigues of the apparatus, he formulates with geometrical precision the idea of the inevitability of the impending struggle: "Such a struggle will inevitably be brutal and will end, most likely, in the establishment of a democratic dictatorship."

Was not the search for the "danger of dictatorship" needed to distract attention from such a candid confession? Was not a search for "reactionaries" needed so that the real reactionaries might go unnoticed? There will, of course, be those who would want to take issue with us:

"Surely you can understand? We are not speaking about proletarian dictatorship but democratic dictatorship." Remaining silent about the class essence of the latter is preferred. Democratic means popular! Surely that much is clear?!

But is it?

Here we have Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin also, who comparatively recently even admired the fact that the 27th party congress had worked per Leninist synopses (here we have a sample of that same evolution), acting as the champion of the "500 days" program (how reminiscent this is of the "five-year plan in four years") and preparing its political officialization—the draft constitution of the Russian Federation. Everything is being implemented under the cover of the proposition concerning the de-ideologization of the state system and public life. Neither anywhere under any circumstances lapse into the words "capitalism," "bourgeois system" and "bourgeois ideology." The style of the democratic etiquette of Western politicians has been assimilated to a tee. It is a question, they say, of the good of the people, of the rights of the individual. True, the individuality of the working person suddenly disappears somewhere, and a "new" ideal—the individuality of the entrepreneur—appears. There is no way they would say: capitalist: male or female.

They do not say. The art of political diplomacy requires the drawing of a veil. They articulate with the utmost clarity as yet: "labor collective." This concept cannot be circumvented or bypassed. Unless you pull the labor collectives over to your side, you will not take possession of the consciousness of the masses. And they are attempting to pull them over, sparing no promises. They are promising that they will make each worker an equal owner of stock and enticing him with equal competitive opportunities. We should mention for fairness' sake that the possibility of inequality arising is acknowledged, but, as those uninitiated in political economy are urged, "Inequality will be the result of honest competition and following an equal start."

Equal? On the one hand, the commanders of the shadow economy with bank accounts and connections—on the other, today's sloggers with unredeemable gold coins.

Neither Popov's "What Is To Be Done?" program nor Yeltsin's "500 days" contain a word about the shadow economy. But they contain a mechanism for its legalization.

And what is the shadow economy if not a direct consequence of the Stalin-Brezhnev political practice and the bitter fruit of deformed socialism? No, the "members of the opposition" are unwilling to tear out ancestral roots. Decidedly unwilling. Here is consistent struggle against Stalinism for you!

The defenders of shadow exploitation are the worst creation of the administrative command system and at the same time, on the other hand, its most fervent and

competent critics. Their descriptions of Soviet bureaucracy and the partocracy are trenchant and stingingly convincing. Why not; they know full well the environment from which they came and in which they emerged as personalities! Have they disavowed their past, cursing it to high heaven? To judge by everything, no. There are few of them who could set an example of disinterestedness. They are by no means short-changing themselves in the allocation of high salaries, living space, and costly trips abroad. Such are the "champions" of social justice.

They are conducting the class struggle in parliament with astonishing skill. As soon as the scales tilt away from them, they become constructivists revealing a readiness for concord in the solution of questions, particular, of course. As soon as the authorities permit a weakness, they are fierce radicals hastily resorting to nonparliamentary forms of pressure in the hope of inclining the authorities toward their demands. They go to mass meetings at which the speakers are not overly selective in their use of expressions: "Down With the CPSU!" "Down With the KGB!" "The President of the USSR Is a Dictator!" Political adversaries are never forgiven a loss of vigilance.

The social and political movements and currents and the newborn parties are undoubtedly more complex than the personality of any of their leaders, who, of course, reflect far from fully the interests of many of the people affiliated to them. Misguided people also, possibly, but sincerely aspiring to the democratic renewal of society. Leaders, however, have always determined and continue to determine the leading trends of the movement they head. In movements called democratic (that same "Democratic Russia," "Rukh" in the Ukraine) these are trends of intolerance and recklessness. They are typical of the petit bourgeois and bourgeois nature of political behavior. And are always dangerous for society.

There is today no greater hypocrisy than paying lip service to the need for preservation of the Soviet Union, but in fact being bent on its destruction. The destructive actions of the leaders manifest not simply their personality traits but the interests of shadow capital, which is longing for power and for which the disintegration of the Soviet Union would be its shining hour. The Union and the attributes of Union power (the government, army, state security) are the last barrier in its way. And the CPSU, of course. Without indoctrination of the mass consciousness it will be difficult for them [as published] to break through to power. This is why they need to change people's ideology and, what is most important, deprive them of their historical memory—"all 73 years gone for nothing!" The intolerance of the persons laying claim to leadership in the excited public consciousness has made itself felt here. No investigation and understanding of the contradictoriness of Soviet history. Political effect has been substituted for investigation. Apropos Ulyanov-Lenin, apropos the party he created, apropos the entire Soviet people.

With feverish rapidity they are raining down on people's consciousness facts that are rigid and adapted to conclusions—verdicts—prepared in advance: on the red terror (not a word about the white terror), the horrors of the civil war (circumventing the subject of the intervention and its horrors), the disastrous nature of the people of Lenin's plan for building socialism (given total silence about the NEP), and the incalculable casualties of collectivization (with concealment of the instances of courageous resistance in the party to Stalin's collectivizing policy).

The entire history of the Soviet period is portrayed as a bloody nightmare. It is denied values common to all mankind, even those that enjoyed the recognition of a grateful mankind—the greatness of the October Revolution, which accelerated mankind's emergence from the imperialist carnage and opened to the world new vistas of civilization; our victory in World War II, which saved mankind from fascism; the Soviet people's labor exploit in the conquest of space and the creation of a guarantee of postwar peace as of the spring of 1945 (without military parity between the USSR and the United States the new political thinking would have remained a pious wish).

A deformed view of the history of the past inevitably engenders a deformed view of the history of the present day. An endeavor to avoid an analysis of the contradictions of the past brings about an indiscriminate evaluation of the present. And, in the wake of this, cruel blows at the conscience of ignorant populism: "All that has gone before is in vain! All that there is now is worthless!" A state of hopelessness and general social embitterment and hatred of the past and, correspondingly, of the present—this alone is what can be engendered by intellectualized philistinism always laying claim to being the sole correct outlook. It is this that has been hurled at the consciousness of people experiencing a need for an awakening in respect of Soviet history. They have come to be compelled to deride this history: "Disavow, and you will be excused."

A most important indication of breeding has always been a passion for cognition of the truth, dialectical cognition, what is more, for truth is a process. The dialectical method of cognition is an inalienable attribute of intellectual culture. It is the scientific cognition of social being that demands a class approach to its analysis. Not the artful use of the momentary mood of social groups and classes but the most careful study of their fundamental interests for the purpose of a search for ways to better satisfy them—this is what is required by sober policy. This policy begins where there are millions representing not an amorphous homogeneous mass but class formations.

The class approach is being skillfully used by the CPSU's political adversaries themselves. True, it is veiled by the "de-ideologization," "depoliticization" and "de-party-ization" concepts, and everything appears highly

original. The de-ideologized system of state administration, say. What does this mean—a system devoid of morals? After all, morals, as not only Soviet but also foreign philosophical dictionaries say, are a manifestation of ideology. Nor is religion spared even. It is, after all, like the depoliticization of the army, a variety of ideology.

While having proclaimed at the 27th congress a renunciation of a simplistic class approach, our party has, to judge by everything, tacitly consigned the scientific method of a class analysis of social life to the historical archives. And has found itself foundering in an evaluation of the current political moment. In fact we are talking about civil harmony, so necessary to society, while refraining from political and moral condemnation of those who are standing in the way of this harmony and openly calling for the overthrow of the Soviet constitutional system. Instead of appealing to the masses for vigilance (as distinct from us, our adversaries are appealing to the workforce with slogans of such content), we are exhorting: keep calm.

Answering the inexorable question of what is to be done, let us tell ourselves: **Primarily rehabilitate the scientific class approach as the method of sociological cognition of social life and the formulation of a policy that is truly scientific.**

The scientific, Leninist class approach never laid claim to universality. It is not extendible to personal life, say, the processes of S&T creativity, the development of the forms and genres of art.... But it is essential for an analysis of the social mood, the alignment of political forces and the possible contradictions between classes and social groups arising, incidentally, as a result also of subjectivism and voluntarism in policy. Today the class approach is particularly necessary for the formulation of a policy capable of averting impending catastrophe—civil war.

Every sober-minded politician and sociologist with respect for his profession avails himself of the method of social-class analysis. He successfully applies the political institutions of any capitalist country.

Our party needs a class approach not per se but to answer the question: The interests of which classes and social groups will we defend, for example, in market relations? Primarily, certainly, the interests of workers, peasants, and members of the intelligentsia who tie their destiny to collective forms of ownership. In other words, a class approach is essential for the implementation and defense of the principle of social justice under the conditions of the market, which is already coming into its own.

But the market will summon into being private enterprise and engender a new social stratum of entrepreneurs. What will our attitude toward their interests be? It could be indirectly positive, that is, expressed in a readiness to enter into an alliance and blocs, but with the political forces that reflect the interests of civilized entrepreneurs who are patriotically disposed and who

think about the good of the Soviet state. As a counterweight to savage capital, which is capable of everything—up to and including the betrayal of national interests.

A scientific class approach requires us to discern behind the verbal concepts that so color our present-day political life (business, privatization, enterprise and so forth) the essence of phenomena requiring a particular, not neutral, attitude toward them. Bureaucratism (soviet and party and also that concealed by democratic signboards), the shadow economy, the partocracy—none of these are neutral concepts. They have a class nature. When we speak of the long-standing power of the party oligarchy, we should acknowledge the possible petit bourgeois degeneration of the apical part of the party. Society is not devoid of intellect and is capable of separating the millions of honest party members from the degenerates.

The class approach is not a method of political sentencing, as it was interpreted in the period of totalitarianism and terror, it is a method of objective analysis and evaluation of social processes. In politics it requires things to be called by their proper name. Only then will the masses know everything and be prepared to accede to everything consciously.

New urgency today is attached to Lenin's proposition, which has long been known and which is now axiomatic, to the effect that people will be foolish victims of deception and self-deception in politics unless they learn to detect behind the variety of political, moral, philosophical and religious phrases, statements and declarations the interests of this class or the other. Tens of thousands of victims of self-deception have given us interethnic conflicts. And just these?

Answering that same sacramental question of what is to be done, let us tell ourselves that in order to avoid nonpeaceful forms of class struggle, that is, to avoid civil war, the CPSU needs to unite around it not only the forces of socialist choice but also all patriotic forces of society. This cannot be done without turning primarily to the working class, before which the party is in arrears. In the years of perestroika the leadership of the party and the country have not properly studied its position and have not formulated a policy satisfying its interests. Neither economic, for the Socialist Enterprise Act has not contributed to the conversion of the workers into the proprietors of production, nor political—in the soviets of all levels the working class does not have a representation in keeping with its role in the system of social production. It is the unclaimed nature of the class approach—in the sense of consideration of the interests of the class constituting the party's main social base—which, I believe, has led to the mass exodus of workers from the CPSU.

The collectivism and internationalism of the working class, which are being sedulously expunged from its

consciousness by the present privatizers, are not contrived characteristics, they are a reality. All of society could easily see this for itself as soon as the workers are accorded the right of control both of the delivery of the manufactured product to its destination and of its distribution among the population. The man of collective productive labor has a greater interest than others in order. He is a man of concord and achieves it more successfully than anyone else. The time has come when the efficiency experts of the government (whatever it is called—soviet or ministerial cabinet) and inspectors of the efficacy of the institutions of presidential authority should be those who produce the bulk of material values.

The presidential edict on the introduction of worker control is a necessary measure. It is a pity that it was belated and was not thought through in all respects. It is necessary to go further—to accord the enterprise workforce broader powers for bringing order to bear and ensuring legality locally. The workers will support the party if it formulates together with them warranted measures to protect the social and political rights of the working man under market conditions. They will support it if it halts market extremism, not passing off the market as a panacea against all evils.

With the transition to the market the political character of Soviet society will be determined by a multistructural economy. It will summon into being a "multistructure" in politics also—multiparty conditions. Parties and public alliances expressing the interests of working private owners will emerge. A loyal attitude toward socialism of those same tenant farmers, cooperative employees, and other entrepreneurs is entirely possible. Most dangerous for them, as also for the CPSU reflecting and defending the interests of the working people in socialist (collective) forms of ownership, is the omnipotence of big capital. Capital capable of growing out of the shadow economy and making its presence felt in the shape of a comprador bourgeoisie. For them the Soviet state, guaranteeing honest private enterprise, is their state. And they are capable of expanding the social base of Soviet power.

Any honest, thinking citizen of our country will support a party that truly consolidates people (regardless of their national and party affiliation and religious belief) for averting the threat of national catastrophe.

...The class approach has just to be mentioned, and all the "custodians" of interests common to all mankind denying that classes at the moment of their ascent to historical progress may be the exponents of these interests begin to intimidate the intelligentsia. This is profitable to the "custodians." Still fresh in the intelligentsia's memory are the vulgarizing methods and crude class and party evaluations of works of art and the results of scientific activity. The "defenders" of free thought are well aware of this and are making skillful use of it.

And the commercialization of culture is already dictating to it its forms and genres, throwing out national

culture and world classics and throwing onto the market a poisonous surrogate. We cannot save society without saving its culture. Its defense against state requisitions and its social protection mean the ethical protection of society itself, without which there cannot be civic harmony. The CPSU will lose the battle for people's minds and hearts unless it understands this. And the people working in culture will lose this battle if they do not see the dangers of general commercialization of human existence.

The questions outlined above are not the sole ones in respect to which clarity is required. It is lacking in the program statement of the 28th CPSU Congress. This latter is, alas, devoid of a class analysis of the dramatic social processes. It contains no characterization of the operating political forces, no evaluation of their alignment and no specific social policy of the party. It fails to reveal the social and class essence of perestroika.

There is now a need for the immediate elaboration of a new party program. The CPSU needs a program not of theoretical but practical possibilities of the extrication of itself and society from the crisis impasse. What is needed is a program arming the party with the strategy and tactics of struggle against organized anticommunism and the surmounting of the legacy of the state party (that same party bureaucratism and communist conceit), which is far from having disappeared as yet. A program that contains not a jot for the illusions of the custodians of the monopoly past and imaginary reformer Communists aspiring not only in theory but in practice to combine the uncombinable—Leninism and Bernsteinism. Without a scientific class approach to an analysis and evaluation of the past and present (perestroika) and the forecasting of tomorrow, not the distant future, such a program cannot be realistic. And it should emerge in the coming months, not years. There is no other way. Society is faced with a choice and it awaits an answer to the question: What is to be done?

Kravchuk Discusses Union Treaty Talks

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in Russian No 3, 19 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament, by SOVETSKAYA KULTURA special correspondents O. Gusev and G. Kondratenko in Kiev; date not given: "Sovereignty: Work Days After the 'Parade'"]

[Text] Kiev—We met Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament, prior to his departure for Moscow for a meeting of the Federation Council.

"I am convinced," L.M. Kravchuk said, "that, despite the lack of balance, 'paralysis of power,' and so forth, we must at both the all-Union and interrepublic levels patiently, insistently, and with respect for one another's legitimate rights and interests eliminate mutual complaints and prejudice and misunderstandings and

affronts and find a common language. Otherwise a joyless, gloomy future awaits all of us."

[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA] The center is now being accused of all sins, imaginable and unimaginable, the implication here being intrigues of the command-administrative system, which has discredited itself. Would you also so accuse it?

[Kravchuk] I am not a prosecutor that I may accuse. But to criticize in point of fact and take issue against ill-conceived and ill-considered decisions, as, for that matter, to support all that is to the good of the cause also, I am ready at any level anywhere. On an official level and in human terms.

The reference point of all evaluations for me is that we are not dependents. The industrious people of the Ukraine produce sufficient to ensure that they could in no way be "kept" by the Union with a negative balance. Nonetheless, no one has yet given a precise answer as to how much the Ukraine puts into the Union purse and of what it disposes itself. Everything should be precisely tallied, in valid prices. But one sometimes has the impression that there is some kindly uncle in the shape of the center, to whom resources fall from somewhere in the skies, and that the republics give it less than it gives out. From where, then, does it get all this? This illusion is very convenient for the creation of the "authority of the center."

The difficulty is that the price system and taxation system are invalid. They are built on an administrative, not market, basis. It is for this reason that no one knows who gives how much to whom. People are given the impression, however, that the center helps all. And are we all loafers and slug-a-beds sponging on it? Each republic goes to the kindly uncles, puts in a request, bows, and receives. It receives "allocations" and "distributions." But we would ask: From what reserves? Meanwhile in the Ukraine, which produces, say, 65 percent of the all-Union sugar, the population is still obtaining it by ration card. There is justice for you. Or, while producing a large quantity of meat, we occupy far from the lead position in terms of level of its per capita consumption.

[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA] Was there any movement in this respect at the meeting of the Federation Council? What was the Ukrainian delegation's position there? What was it seeking, what kind of proposals did it make, and were they accepted?

[Kravchuk] Before the meeting, I was sent a draft agreement for 1991 pertaining to a stabilization of the socio-economic situation in the country. And I was, I confess, upset upon becoming familiar with it: I had on four occasions received virtually unchanged one and the same document. I was hoping it was not the fifth occasion.

Fortunately, my misgivings were unfounded. Whereas earlier, until recently at least, many republics had been thinking more about themselves than about others and

points of dissension were predominant, serious agreements were reached at this meeting. Remember the "budget sensation" which erupted at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies? The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet had decided to reduce five-fold its payments to the Union budget, thus plunging both the president and the whole high assembly into a state of shock. Of what kind of all-Union treasury could we speak after this? Of what kind of all-Union programs? But overlooking everything else, the Russian Supreme Soviet and its leaders were thinking about their own people. They cannot do otherwise. But what about the country and the common problems? A correct solution needed to be found, and it was found. The document was accepted by the republics. Representatives of the Baltic republics set forth their own special opinion. Specifically, they prefer the "Union—republic" version, that is, as two states, not as subscribers to a common treaty, although it has to be assumed that this is not a conclusive position. Everyone deemed it necessary to complete as quickly as possible work on the conclusion of agreements between enterprises, regardless of their location, and to facilitate the preservation of established business relations.

As far as the Ukraine is concerned, after lengthy discussion it was agreed that all turnover tax, not 70 percent, as before, would now remain at the republic's disposal. This is a very substantial addition to its budget—7 billion rubles [R]. Russia, Belorussia, and other republics arrived at the same agreement, each with its own set of arguments, it is true.

Account was taken at the Ukraine's suggestion of the established horizontal relations between the republics. Part of the taxes from export-import transactions will belong to it now also. The question of a proportional share among the republics of the foreign currency debt was raised.

The discussion of prices was particularly keen. The delegations of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia agreed that representatives of these republics would get together soon and agree on coordinated actions in the sphere of the pricing of basic necessities. Compensating for the increase in prices will require a considerable amount of money. It will be necessary to protect primarily the needy strata of the population—invalids, retirees, students, and others. The republic will prepare for this thoroughly and in advance.

Exceptional importance is attached to coordination of the actions of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia under market conditions. We will create a managerial body which will involve itself in both contract relations and economic problems, prices included. As far as the Ukraine is concerned, we will adopt an extraordinarily attentive approach to the price rises to prevent chaos in these matters and to ensure that the working people do not suffer. The rise in retail prices has altogether been brought about by the increase in wholesale and purchase prices. We have been placed in this position and are now

forced to seek a way out. The Ukraine has decided as of now to declare a freeze on any price increase whatever in all spheres of the republic prior to 1 March of this year.

[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA] You, Leonid Makarovich, have secured the reputation of an ardent supporter of the state sovereignty of the Ukraine. However, as the whole of the most recent, for the most part sorry and, at times, simply chaotic, experience testifies, it is quite a way from political declarations through their suffusion with material content. The war of "laws," which has not bypassed the Ukraine either, continues. Some people see sovereignty as a panacea for all troubles, others are treating it coolly, not to say in hostile fashion. There are also those who are twisting the idea itself beyond recognition and transforming it into separatism and isolationism. Six months have elapsed since the time of the adoption of the declaration on the state sovereignty of the Ukraine on 16 July 1990. A short time, nonetheless....

[Kravchuk] All of which you speak may be observed in our republic also. At the same time I categorically do not share the viewpoints of those who are disposed to wax ironical virtually about the "parade of sovereignties." This is a very serious and profound phenomenon and cannot be underestimated. Thanks to the fact that we have in reality perceived some measure of independence, we are already achieving some changes for the better. I say "perceived" inasmuch as we still have a long way to go to sovereignty proper. As one of our writers said, for the Ukraine to perceive sovereignty it needs to be perceived in Moscow. But the center does not perceive this yet, I believe. M.S. Gorbachev himself, the author of the "Union of sovereign states" formula, is giving way and experiencing the pressure of centrist forces, and for this reason it has a muffled sound. It is sufficient to say that the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies declined even to discuss this topic.

Why do some figures dislike the path of sovereignty, why do they reject it? They say, for example, that after such declarations have been signed, the old ties will break down of their own accord. But how are we to evaluate the fact that many economic mechanisms which stabilized the development of the country's national economy have broken down in the last five years, but by no means as of the past year marked by the "parade of sovereignties"? This is nothing other than a consequence of the incompetence of many central organs of administration and their incapacity for tackling urgent problems. And it is for this reason that the republic sovereignties will be an effective means of protection against the incompetence and at times political recklessness of managers of the highest levels.

The aspiration to sovereignty, to be honest, also alerts some rank-and-file citizens. I refer primarily to the Russian-speaking population of the Ukraine, and it is here more than 11 million strong. It is feared that the sovereignty which is being offered them specifically by

the parliamentary opposition is, they say, for Ukrainians. And then immediately comes the thought: What about us, what will happen to us? There are grounds for such questions: The situation in Lithuania and in Moldova is known to all. It has not with us, thank God, reached the point of such deformations, such disregard for human rights. Nonetheless, people are thinking: If in the future the upper hand is gained by those who glorify Bandera and Petlyura, what will happen to us?

I am convinced that in the Ukraine there can be only the equality of all people, only sovereignty for all and the possibility of the development of culture and social development for all nations, both large and small. It cannot be otherwise! Else we would rock this enormous boat—the Ukraine—a state of European proportions. And then all processes—the fundamental rebirth of our society, spiritual renewal, and regeneration—would be cut short altogether. For on the one hand the conservatives and, on the other, the latter-day democrats are already striving after dictatorship and special powers.

By the start of January the Ukraine had concluded agreements on political, economic, and cultural cooperation with 13 republics. We have approved a plan and budget for 1991 showing a deficit, but we are really taking account of the singularities of the current stage.

We have protected the home market and the consumer, which is being mentioned by all who have been able to compare the situation in Kiev and other major cities of the country. And the fact that I am sometimes called the "godfather" of ration cards, as a second currency of the times of perestroika, I in no way consider offensive. Goods have gradually begun to appear in the stores, people were, after all, unable to get hold of a television receiver, although there are several television plants. The coupons have helped reveal some very interesting things. Thus, say, R5 billion in cash is sufficient for us for monetary circulation. But it transpired that R9 billion of merchandise was spontaneously vanishing from the Ukraine annually. The coupons are in this sense helping reduce the real inflation of the ruble.

We are taking advantage of every opportunity to ensure that the budget "not crack" and that, primarily, the social programs not be harmed. An acute question today, for example, is the issue of the wages of teachers and doctors, as they are below the republic average. In accounts of enterprises of the Ukraine there is currently approximately R24 billion that is immobile. The work force will find a prudent application for these financial reserves. We, on the other hand, have found resources for the development of the countryside also. We will struggle as resolutely as possible, not by administrative but economic methods, it is true, against the orgy of so-called "contracted prices." Is it not commercial gangsterism when, say, a R1 can of fruit juice produced in the Ukraine is sold here for R5. We will take everything into consideration: Who is negotiating with whom, on what basis, at whose expense. We will establish the strictest economic sanctions against easy money.

Of course, none of this in any way signifies that we will display concern only for ourselves and our own people. The above-mentioned agreements with the republics of the USSR stipulate mutually profitable ties. And, of course, we will fulfill our commitments to others and the Union as a whole in full and demand the same attitude toward ourselves.

[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA] The Ukraine is a vast and complex organism. How is the idea of signing the Union treaty being received in the republic?

[Kravchuk] I will not deny that you really could not call the situation in the republic straightforward, too much of everything is interwoven here. Nonetheless, among the masses of the population, among the people—I say this with all certainty and unequivocation—there is a sober evaluation of the fact that a severance from the other republics of the country is impossible: either politically or economically. The parliamentary majority and I, as chairman, proceed from the fact that the country needs a Union based on the horizontal relations of the republics. We are for a strengthening of the economic and other ties and the building of new structures of a new Union. We are hoping prior to the upcoming referendum in connection with the future of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to offer people a concept which lets them know, when voting, that it is a question of a historic document which will not only afford us political and economic rights but also help us all together and each individually to live and work better. This should be not a renewed but new economic and political formation, which people may join as they wish, and may leave it also. And for such a concept we need not to confine ourselves to a narrow national framework but to develop interethnic, interrepublic ties—trade, economic, cultural, spiritual—and teach people to work and live under the conditions of the new reality connected with the transition to market relations.

[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA] What did you mean when in one of your speeches you spoke about a desire to see in the system of a future Ukraine and its structure a reflection also of the principles of the Zaporozhye Cossacks?

[Kravchuk] Primarily that we do not at all need to necessarily derive each and everything from others' experience when we have pretty good experience of our own. In work on the new republic constitution, for example, I am sure that we should not transfer to it in pure form articles from the American, British, or any other basic laws if only because we have our own soil of statehood and our own customs and morals, in outward behavior even, not to mention culture, art, and science, which differ to a large extent from foreign customs and morals. We need to restore the forcibly interrupted link of the times, honor the illustrious deeds of our forefathers, and know where our roots lie. And at the same time we will be open to all the very best from the world community.

Further, the Ukrainian Cossacks did not become downhearted and did not weep and in the most evil times fought to the last drop of blood in the name of the interests of their motherland. But just look at how much whining there is all around today and at how many various kinds of "mourners" have multiplied both in the center and in cities and villages far from Moscow. Practically nothing is being done here to reinforce the collapsing ties and for an uplift of people's creative spirit. Is progress possible in such a mood? Hardly. Nonetheless, we have made such masochism the fashion virtually—at work, in the press, and on radio and television. And it is not fortuitous that angry voices are being heard in response: "Stop, come to your senses, the people are tired of self-abasement!" I am not calling for false bravado in our situation. But, truly, I would very much like to see notes of optimism becoming a part of our life more quickly. We should stop moaning, soliciting foreign charitable handouts; we need to get down to the serious business of the restructuring our society more quickly and more firmly. And, finally, to reinforce our faith in people, in the future: After all, it is impossible to live a better life without a belief in something better. Either we all understand this together or it will be necessary to scatter to our own national apartments, which, as experience has shown, is fraught with great misfortunes.

And it would do no harm to give some thought to pride also: What example to their children is being set by statesmen acknowledging their own impotence.

[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA] Much is being said currently about the unsteadiness and instability accumulating in society. It is inexorably approaching critical mass, allegedly, and when the situation reaches red, a straight road to dictatorship will have been opened. People are being intimidated with the coming to power of aggressive-revanchist forces, which will crush the shoots of democracy which are springing up and establish "iron order." You move among the top state leaders, and we would like to know what you personally think about this?

[Kravchuk] These are not inventions. Some people, harassed by the shortages, empty shelves, and so forth, might not object initially, perhaps, to "iron authority." The lack of assurance as to the future preys on the mind, prevents normal work....

I believe that the people do not, as a whole, want, cannot want a return to the old ways for they remember how they were mocked, how their rights were curtailed, how legality was violated everywhere.... Nonetheless, I believe that there could come a moment when suspicious forces could break through to power, taking advantage of the people's discontent for their own selfish purposes. It is here that each republic would in itself be powerless in combat with them. This is why I personally am for a Union of sovereign republics: Aside from all else, I see it as a guarantee against a return to the grimmest years of totalitarianism. But the voluntary principle must operate

here. People must be persuaded by their own experience of the need for a Union where their interests are taken into account and their rights ensured.

It should not only be thought that the authoritarian danger lies in wait for us exclusively from the right. It is far from fortuitous that it is precisely now, against this political background, that a kind of sobering-up process of the supporters of the "arch-democrats" and an understanding that they are not such angels as they would like to appear has begun. After, say, the Lvov Oblast Soviet adopted a decree on its leader being accorded emergency powers, on a ban on all mass meetings and demonstrations contradicting their actions, on the holding of a referendum on a ban on the activity of the Communist Party on its territory, and so on and so forth, everyone saw that such "democrats," like other Lvov persons, are more disposed toward dictatorship than anyone else. This is the resulting situation: The "partocrat" Kravchuk is having to defend democracy against the new-model "democrat."

And people are noticing, what is more, that in practical matters also some of the "ultra-left" are not always competent and not always true to their word and the promises they have made. After all, in terms of the most important indicators of economic management that same Lvov Oblast is worse than other oblasts of the Ukraine. And the endless references of some Lvov leaders to the fact that they are working in isolation and that they are being passed by when it comes to the regularity of supplies are groundless. The problem lies elsewhere: Many men of letters, journalists, and representatives of the artistic workshops who have seldom been involved in the specifics of production, if at all, have come to power there. This is, of course, more their misfortune than their fault, but they cannot in this case blame others, including communist leaders, for their own deficiencies. For members of the CPSU in other regions arrived at the year's end with far more substantial results, as a rule, than their opponents. Yet they are now hearing kind words about themselves increasingly less, unfortunately. The members of parliament should not forget this.

[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA] If only briefly, concerning the work of the parliament proper. There have been periods when such passions and such extremism have raged outside the Supreme Soviet building on Kreshchatik that it seemed that just a little more and there would be an explosion. Have you personally had moments of fear?

[Kravchuk] Believe it or not, as they say, I have had no fear. But there were days when I simply had no desire to come to the parliament and bowed to duty. The debate was so difficult and opponents would behave with such implacability that I would frequently find myself in the role of partner of the deaf.

I confess that I was "pressed" at the tensest, most dangerous moments, when anything might have been

expected of the enraged crowd: Give the command for order to be restored. And such appeals were heard in letters, telegrams, and telephone calls from ordinary citizens, what is more. However, the majority of parliament did not waver, and we got by without bloodshed—and this, as is now apparent, was an important lesson for all of us. But how certain forces were provoking the militia and ordinary Kievans to noisy scenes and fights even!

Many people, myself included, would undoubtedly like to see within the walls of parliament a picture of general accord more quickly, but, you will agree, "consolidation" introduced forcibly would not be worth very much. Let there be a struggle of parties, opinions, positions, interests—this is natural. But we have no intention of yielding to the diktat of the opposition movements and public formations which gained momentum for a certain period of time. Our task is to work with all due responsibility in the interests of the people.

[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA] Can you in the intricate, contradictory, and rapidly changing mosaic of political processes and events of the past year distinguish some dominant feature making its mark on all that is happening in the republic?

[Kravchuk] Everything is so interconnected that it is at times difficult to distinguish between cause and effect. Events are developing at a headlong pace, and what initially might have seemed negligible and secondary is suddenly growing in significance and pulling into its magnetic field more and more masses of excited people. Unfortunately, we live in times when much is done under the influence of the public mood. And mood is, as you understand, a changeable, capricious, and willful, but extremely unreliable thing. It is capable of "self-combustion" on the most varied and at times entirely unexpected pretexts. And having "combusted," it is capable of sending a situation out of control and imparting to it the nature of a crisis. In this atmosphere the actions of politicians must be balanced and responsible in the extreme, decisive, comprehensible, and at the same time circumspect. We are all learning this. It is particularly important to be able to look ahead and accurately forecast all versions of the consequences of this step or the other.

To speak, however, of a dominant feature, some generalized inner motive which determined the behavior of

large human masses, it seems to me that the past year was unique precisely in terms of the depth of the changes in people's consciousness. The very procedure of the nomination of candidates for people's deputy and the first really free elections and their results enabled the people to recognize themselves and their power and might. And those who had laid claim to a place at the helm of power also saw this popular power for the first time virtually: People may now not only vote as they wish, as they consider right, but also not vote at all if they have been offered a worthless candidate. As a result of the elections a number of candidates were unable to recover from the shock and psychological crackup and left their directive, party-appointment offices for good. But the winners, the super-radical deputies particularly, were in the grip of unprecedented euphoria. But life does not, after all, consist of one mass-meeting campaign, demonstrations, and verbal altercations with real and imaginary opponents. It is necessary to work and show that you really are up to the state calling and to seek and at all costs find solutions which bolster the health of our society.

However distressing, not everyone is passing this test of maturity.

[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA] A final question, fashionable for the times: What kind of privileges do you enjoy?

[Kravchuk] Well, the office is quite spacious for one person, is it not? I drive a white Volga, unescorted, it is better this way, you know. My apartment, three rooms, is the same, so is my dacha. I work from 0900 until 2100.... Some of the privileges which were very dear to me I have lost. The possibilities of moving about freely have diminished greatly. I can no longer take my grandchildren Andreyka and Mariyka by the hand and go for a stroll down Kreshchatik. A mass meeting or some such would develop. Someone would want to mention his support, another to insult me, and, on the whole, what kind of stroll is this....

To which papers do I subscribe? I take them all, practically all Union and republic papers, and I like and read regularly SOVETSKAYA KULTURA. I shall not change this long-standing attachment to it [end Kravchuk]

...We take our leave of Leonid Makarovich and express to him the sincere hope that he confidently steer the Ukrainian Parliament through all the reefs and inclement weather in the new year.

Baltics

Estonia: 15 January Rally Demands Debated

91UN0842A Tallinn VECHERNIY TALLINN
in Russian 17 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by Aili Sandre: "Two Against Nine"]

[Text] Bring prices to a level that existed before 15 October, revise the laws on taxation and make them correspond to the laws that are in effect in the USSR, restore the constitutions of the USSR and the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], fulfill the ukases of the president of the USSR, and form a new government on a quota basis—these briefly are the demands made of the Supreme Soviet by the participants in the rally at Toompea on 15 January, the response to which was supposed to have been given at noon yesterday.

At 1200 hours in Toompea Palace, the following sat down on one side of a table: Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and Speaker Ulo Nugis; and on the other side, a more representative group: Igor Shepelevich, chairman of OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives] and USSR people's deputy; Yevgeniy Kogan, a representative of Intermovement; Pavel Panfilov, secretary of the Estonian Communist Party (CPSU); Aleksey Lukoshkin, chairman of the council of directors of the OSTK; Vladimir Lebedev, leader of the deputy group "For Equal Rights," and others—nine people in all. Inasmuch as there was representation of people from various movements, organizations, establishments, and enterprises, Arnold Ruutel proposed that they state their position and specify their demands, because those that were submitted on 15 January are of an unspecific and general nature. After which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet would examine them in the established order. Before responding to the proposal of the Supreme Soviet chairman, Pavel Panfilov asked that the journalists and also the Supreme Soviet Commission on the Press report the events of the past few days in an objective way. Everything that was written until now, in his opinion, is close to the truth, but it is not the truth. Pavel Panfilov added that this, possibly, is only his subjective interpretation. Arnold Ruutel's proposal was not heeded, and no attention was paid to the fact that in the last several days about a thousand statements and proposals were submitted to the Supreme Soviet Presidium by various enterprises and organizers of the 15 January rallies in other cities of Estonia—it was physically not possible to answer all of them in a short time. Igor Shepelevich wanted to hear a specific answer on whether the Supreme Soviet chairman and speaker will continue the dialogue which has lasted for more than a year, or whether a new one should be started, or whether they should break up at once. Ulo Nugis noted that it could be possible to begin the dialogue. (For it is possible on some of the demands.)

"We cannot now conduct a dialogue on this question (about the resignation of the government). I do not have

such authority. This has to be discussed at another level, and not here now at this table," said Arnold Ruutel. Therefore, he proposed discussing specific proposals. But nothing came of this.

The delegation noted that it is not only they who demand the resignation of the government and the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet (as being incapable of resolving the most important problems); this was done from the very beginning of the work of the government and the parliament (cited as an example was Kaido Kama who to this day holds a firm position on this question). Pavel Panfilov spoke in this vein: That their positions are clear, but they are not simple, and they give room for searches and different variants... Incidentally, he was the only one in the delegation who treated the problem of a lack of time noted by A. Ruutel with understanding, and he recommended convening again after the Presidium is prepared to give answers and proposals. In turn, Ulo Nugis proposed conducting matters in a legal way. In the sense that there are delegation representatives on the staff of the Supreme Soviet (among those present this was Lebedev and Panfilov), let them develop their own draft law (for example about taxation and other things) and submit it for discussion to the Supreme Soviet. It would be very logical to resolve questions in a parliamentary way, and not with the help of ultimatums. A small debate arose, which was not brought to a conclusion inasmuch as P. Panfilov received a note from V. Lebedev, after which all nine members of the delegation got up and moved toward the exit—the meeting ended without results. Toward evening, it was promised to convene the coordination committee (in the building of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee), which was to decide what would be done further...

At the exit, Pavel Panfilov was surrounded by journalists. Here are some of his answers to questions. The coordination committee will decide whether there will be a strike or not. Before this, referendums will be held at enterprises to clarify the opinion of the workers. We demand specific answers to specific questions, but this should not mean that apparently we demand an immediate dissolution of the government. The coordination committee was established for the purpose of seeing to it that Estonia, finally, receives the kind of government that is concerned in an equal way about the welfare of the whole population, and that specialists work in it and not politicians as now. In Pavel Panfilov's opinion, the leaders of the Government of Estonia must be Estonians (the president, prime minister, and also a majority of the ministers). He does not see a post for himself in the government.

What will happen tomorrow? "Nothing. As I have already said, the coordination committee will convene, and it will make a decision," answered P. Panfilov. In his opinion, military units will not be introduced in Estonia. "We do not need soldiers. You yourselves saw how the rally went, and what the general situation is. It is entirely different here from Lithuania and Latvia—no one is seizing buildings, and the party is not making any kinds

of demands. In my opinion, we are conducting negotiations in a cultured and civilized way, as is accepted among people. The main thing is for our life to change for the better. We are not so naive as to suppose that if a new person comes in place of Savisaar matters will there and then move in the direction of improvement..."

Sensible words. If only the demands were exactly like that... How is it possible to demand from the government, the Supreme Soviet, and the Estonian people, who have chosen a path to independence and state self-dependence, fulfillment of the ukases of the president (even in the so-called transitional period)? Or the restoration of the USSR Constitution?

Lithuania's Independence Party Chief Interviewed

91UN0821A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
15 Dec 90 p 2

[Interview with Virgilijus Cepaitis, chairman of the Independence Party, by EKHO LITVY correspondent R. Oshero; place and date not given: "A Class of Owners Is Our Base"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Your party was created very recently. Could you tell us a little about the history of its creation nonetheless?

[Cepaitis] I would rather say our prior history. It is closely tied to Sajudis that developed as a mass sociopolitical movement, and had shortcomings that are characteristic of all movements—being amorphous and lacking organization. This is why in Sajudis there have always been supporters [of the idea] that a party is necessary that could translate more consistently the ideals of Sajudis into reality.

Even when I was executive secretary of Sajudis and a member of the council, I—or more precisely we, the members of the council—came out against attempts to turn Sajudis into a party because this could also signify the end of it. An organism that large could simply lose its identity in the course of abrupt changes. However, after our candidates won elections to the Supreme Council of Lithuania it turned out that by delegating its representatives to the parliament and the government Sajudis automatically deprived them of grassroots support because, in keeping with its statute, those who have been elected to leadership positions in the echelons of state leave the leadership structures of Sajudis.

Therefore, the concept came up of creating a party from a segment of Sajudis in order to be able to support the people who now work in the Supreme Council with a view to implementing the Sajudis program.

[Correspondent] As I recall, initially this was the 11 March Party.

[Cepaitis] Indeed, the first attempt to form a party was made precisely when the issue of a moratorium was being discussed, when a threat to the 11 March Act was

looming. It was named the Independence Party as recently as its congress on 22 October. Two significant moments in our brief history may be noted: an appeal to the citizens of Lithuania that referred to the creation of our party and the October congress that confirmed a program, a statute, and our leading organs.

[Correspondent] All parties express someone's interests, those of a certain strata of society and classes. What about the Independence Party?

[Cepaitis] This has to do with the differentiation that is now under way in our society. We would like to be supported by precisely the strata that are now merely emerging—private owners. We believe that he is truly free who owns property. He is a guarantor of democracy, and he influences the government and the parliament because he has property and follows closely how his money, which the government collects in the form of taxes, is spent. He sees that the money is spent carefully and wisely. What the government does makes virtually no difference to an individual who has nothing; he expects only sops of some kind, and expects that his life will be made easier.

This is natural in the world from which we were severed 50 years ago and to which we are now returning. This is why we believe that a class of owners needs to be created in Lithuania as soon as possible, and this class should be as numerous as possible.

[Correspondent] Of course, becoming an owner is a lucrative prospect, but I am afraid it is not that simple. What ways do you see to implement these plans?

[Cepaitis] At present, the major danger is that the nomenklatura, i.e., the class that prevailed over virtually all of us, will attempt to usurp all the assets it has owned until now without any legal justification. Kolkhoz chairmen will want to buy out their kolkhozes, plant managers will want to buy out their plants, and the party nomenklatura will divide up party assets among themselves. We also see this trend—rapid, altogether instant privatization—in the USSR.

This is why we support a draft under which a segment of state assets created by our joint efforts will be distributed to those who have created it. We need to discuss the principle on which this will be done and resolve this together. The main point is to hand over to the people in this manner a segment of what they have acquired with their own labor; let them become owners right away.

We believe that in the course of this movement toward privatization we need to equalize opportunities given to all people as much as possible. The field should be as level as possible. We interpret social justice as creating this class of owners, which should consist of all citizens of Lithuania regardless of nationality, all of those who have worked here creating our assets.

[Correspondent] One of the resolutions adopted at the congress of your party refers to communist organizations

in Lithuania. Do you think that a new round of "witch hunting" is beginning in this manner? In general, by calling for Communists to be tried and barring them from leadership positions, do you not replicate the actions of those you denounce?

[Cepaitis] Our resolution says that we believe the activities of the Communist Party as an organization to be criminal, and that it is necessary to apportion the blame of all individuals. I believe that a trial similar to the Nuremberg one, at which the role of the Communist Party in history will be evaluated, will sooner or later be held in Moscow as well. However, we do not at all believe that all members of the Communist Party are guilty (however, according to our statute, we do not admit its former members to our party).

The words that are attributed to us, to the effect that we demand that rank and file Communists do not hold leadership positions, are absolutely untrue. It is specifically the party nomenklatura, and specifically during this period of transition, who should not hold executive positions in Lithuania because they are connected to old structures by various bonds of friendship and business. At present, we need new people not burdened by their past.

We believe that the economic situation that exists in Estonia and a slowdown in the development of an economic reform program and all changes is due to the fact that people who have been in the government for decades now dominate it. They cannot and do not know how to work otherwise, without instructions, without tutelage from the top. We need people capable of working independently, those who think in a new manner.

[Correspondent] Do you think that you will find ways of your own in political and economic activities, or will you use already existing foreign models?

[Cepaitis] International experience definitely needs to be taken into account. Even now we have quite close ties to Western parties of a rather conservative description. There is an organization that we cooperate with—the European Democratic Union. Parties such as the British Conservatives, Moderato from Sweden (recently, I attended their congress and spoke there), the Austrian People's Party, that is, parties that favor conservative foundations, traditions, private property, free markets, and, as their statutes say, are against collectivist dogmas belong to it.

I must say that, despite our party being conservative, foundations and old traditions need to be translated into reality first in order to defend them because we live in an inverted society of sorts. Therefore, we need to be revolutionaries first in order to become conservatives. This is an expression of our peculiarities, of the peculiarity of the current political situation in the environment of Lithuania.

Of course, this calls for new approaches, "our own" approaches, as you put it.

[Correspondent] In an interview, you outlined the future of Lithuania as an independent state that has no political ties to the USSR.

[Cepaitis] Having no political ties to the USSR does not at all mean having no ties period. I believe that it is necessary to maintain and develop economic relations and to have diplomatic relations. That is to say, as far as we are concerned, the USSR should be a friendly state, and good-neighborly relations should develop normally. By saying that there should be no political ties, I mean that Lithuania should not belong to any tight union with the USSR, be it a federation, a confederation, or anything else.

[Correspondent] To put it mildly, a segment of the Russian-speaking populace mistrusts the Independence Party somewhat.

[Cepaitis] First, any citizen of Lithuania, regardless of his nationality, may belong to our party. Even now it does not consist exclusively of Lithuanians. I believe that problems that exist arise because of insufficient information. My personal impression is that ethnic tension has subsided compared to, for example, last year. The non-Lithuanian population is beginning to perceive that all they have been told—that the Lithuanians will throw them out of Lithuania and will ban speaking in a language other than Lithuanian—has not come true. Eight months have already passed since 11 March, but nothing of the kind has happened.

After all, if a democratic state is what we want to create, it cannot be democratic for one nation only. Democracy is a mechanism that applies to all. We have already adopted a law and will adopt other laws regarding the rights of ethnic minorities. I say this in my capacity as chairman of the Commission for Civil Rights.

[Correspondent] Thank you for the interview.

CDI Leader Views Situation in Latvia

91UN0790A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 26 Jan 91 pp 1-2

[Report on interview with Aleksandr Gaponenko, deputy in the Riga City Soviet of People's Deputies and leader of the Center for Democratic Initiative faction, by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent Aleksandr Krotkov; place and date not given: "Latvia: A View From Inside—In a Distorting Mirror of Half-Truths"]

[Text] The newspapers, it seems, have already succeeded in surfeiting readers with contradictory versions of events in the Baltics. In any case, this is indicated by telephone calls to "RT" [*RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*]. Does it make any sense to continue to try to read carefully the pile of information on this score, they ask us, when it is apparent anyway that commentators from both the left and the right

"squint" with one eye? Here you never know, and you yourself "go blind in both eyes..."

The position of Aleksandr Gaponenko, a deputy in the Riga City Soviet of People's Deputies and leader of the Center for Democratic Initiative [CDI], whom our correspondent interviewed, is distinguished, it seems to us, by its impartiality.

"Perhaps the most dangerous ailment in an assessment of the political situation," Aleksandr Vladimirovich believes, "is a 'short' memory, which hinders assessing events after having seen their development. Alas, the press, which reflects the official position of the center, does not want to recall at all that initially all changes in Latvia went under the flag of a more decisive transition to a market. Moscow obviously procrastinated here.

"Consequently, all of the responsibility for today's situation in the republic should not be placed exclusively on the local government.

"On the other hand, the leftist (anticommunist) press is trying earnestly not to note the militant nationalism of the Baltic governments, which is turning into genocide with respect to the 'nonindigenous' population, and also, to put it mildly, their awkward economic decisions.

"It is miserable to observe how today's radicals and democrats are succumbing to the sin that for many years hindered Communists from looking at things sensibly: They sincerely believe in the irreproachability and high morality of the followers of their idea on this basis alone, that the idea itself is moral."

[Krotkov] But, in the first place, not only the "early" Communists sinned in this, but also all of those who were zealous believers long before the birth of the communist idea. But, secondly, such a belief is by no means always sincere, and political considerations are often behind it. By the way, are you a Communist?

[Gaponenko] I am a member of the Communist Party. Although I am more of a social-democrat by conviction. But until persecution of the Communists in the republic stops, I will not give up my party card. This would be interpreted as cowardice.

[Krotkov] Is the lot of a Communist and a Russian in the Baltics that difficult? Some "RT" readers ask: Is not the party press making a mountain out of a molehill in order to incite the people's hatred against the "runaway" republics, and to present their "occupation" as a "liberation" of "our people" from misfortune?

[Gaponenko] I will not try to speak for the whole Baltic area. But the majority of my Riga-Latvian acquaintances have not changed their treatment of me. It would be a great exaggeration to assert that the entire indigenous population were seized with chauvinism and intolerance.

The trouble, however, is that the loudest of all voices heard today in Riga belong to those with a cast iron

throat. They are the most noticeable minority. It is these people who ring up the Communists, simply Russians, threatening reprisal. I got such calls at home also.

What is most paradoxical, which I cannot say unequivocally, is what nationality I belong to. In our clan, there are Latvians, and Ukrainians, and Poles, and Armenians, and Georgians, and Russians. But in the family, we speak Latvian.

But the tone is set not only by the street, but by parliament as well. Although the concept of citizenship is not yet officially recognized by it, the laws applied in Latvia are driven by it. Thus, according to the Law on Joint Stock Companies, only citizens of the republic have a right to be stockholders, and this includes only those who lived here before the 1940's. And naturally, their descendants... Full pension is also enjoyed only by citizens, and the other older people get a 70-ruble pension, on which you can only die of hunger. And, for example, my mother—a participant in the Leningrad blockade who worked as a nurse in a hospital—it turns out, does not have the right to a full pension.

The draft of the republic law on employment also proposes that only citizens will be included among the officially unemployed...

[Krotkov] What kind of unemployment does this threaten for the Russian-speaking population?

[Gaponenko] I cannot give you official figures. The People's Front, after coming to power, made all statistical data secret concerning such "slippery" questions. The same data that the Communists recently disclosed. This is by way of the question of democracy and glasnost.

According to my estimates, in connection with the proposed termination of a number of enterprises of a Union subordination, the number of unemployed (mainly Russian-speaking) can jump from 100,000 to 150,000 just in Riga alone.

[Krotkov] What is the reason for closing Union enterprises?

[Gaponenko] Only political. And the political interests here clearly conflict with economic interests. In exactly the same way as in the case of cooperatives for which our Minister of Internal Affairs Vaznis gave a secret instruction to collect compromising material, in order to set up their "demonstration flogging."

The fact is that among the most enterprising cooperatives, the majority are Russian. And now the government plans to suppress these, excuse the everyday expression, pioneers of the market economy, which it supports in public.

Not only the Russians, but the Latvians as well, are suffering from the inconsistent and unreasonable economic policy of the Republic Government. For some reason, the central press did not notice one revealing

fact. Mainly rural residents were standing as pickets defending the local parliament and the Council of Ministers from an expected alleged attack by black berets. They were rather amazed that the Latvian city residents did not join them and did not take to the barricades.

The sharp increase in prices for food products, which caused an outburst of dissatisfaction in Latvia, hit the villagers least of all—to whom the republic government turned for help, fearing "occupation" on the part of the Union. That is, our authorities, starting with the fact that they played off the Latvians against the newcomers, and through the hands of the former tried to be done with the latter, now have come to the point of driving a wedge between the city and the village.

[Krotkov] An inevitable evolution of the policy of any authoritarian regime. It is exactly this kind of development of events in their cities that frightens the Moscow and Leningrad leftist radicals.

[Gaponenko] Well, if a national dictatorship of Baltic governments is declared the apex of democracy, and the Russian-speaking population, which constitutes half of all of the people who live here, are not taken into account, then, indeed, this kind of development of events can really take place. But only a blind and deaf person can think this way. Or a person who, through words about the defense of democracy, is concealing his own selfish interests. What kind? Well, better, they say, totalitarianism in its most truculent form—there on the Baltic coast—than even a weak hint of strong central authority in the land of the Union.

[Krotkov] That was put beautifully. But, I guess, objections can be made: All of this verbal beauty has one sole aim—to return the Baltics to the Union.

[Gaponenko] Let us look at this sensibly: What is more advantageous to the center—to have within the structure of the Union a second Afghanistan, bristling with the rifles of forest brothers, or a free neighbor connected to Moscow by mutually profitable economic contacts that are a hundred times stronger than any barbed wire? It is obvious even to a child that Latvia's economy, just as Estonia's with Lithuania, is gradationally oriented on the Union.

But the freedom of such a neighbor must not only be foreign economic freedom, but also domestic political freedom, which is the most important international norm. It would not hurt if this were kept in mind by our logical democrats, who enthusiastically supported the United States when it made economic assistance to the USSR dependent on the observance of individual rights in our country.

RSFSR

Writers Protest Yeltsin Baltic Statement

91UN07964 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 25 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Open letter from writers to B.N. Yeltsin: "A Resolute Protest: What Is Honor and What Is Disgrace"]

[Text] Boris Nikolayevich!

In your statement on the situation in Lithuania you assumed the right to speak on behalf of Russia and its peoples about the tragic events taking place in the Baltic republics. Yes, you have the right to make statements within the limits of the powers conferred upon you by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies. However, this does not include the right to single-handedly decide the fate of the peoples of Russia in circumstances which involve millions of our compatriots who live in the Union republics.

The blood that was spilled on the streets of Vilnius is our common pain and tragedy. You know full well that the numerical and historical inculcation of Russia in the Baltic lands is such that nobody has a right to question the Russians' appropriateness in insisting on their lawful rights and freedoms in these republics. Therefore the responsibility for what is happening can in no way be placed on those whom the Baltic nationalists do not consider a "native" population.

Russia has always had and still has one great right and duty—to defend its compatriots and blood brothers wherever they live.

Your unrelenting use of the expression "Russian-speaking population," not worthy of a political leader of Russia, which you persistently used in your statement at the press conference not only in reference to the Baltic Russians, but also in reference to the Russians who live on their historic lands, speaks loudly of your attitude towards your people.

The calls for, and the discourse about, the traditions of Russian military glory that have sounded in your appeal to the military and that provoke the army to breach its pledge of allegiance is just another proof of your disdain for Russian history and your propensity for political games. Your statement about the creation of the Armed Forces of Russia is nothing but an instigation of a civil war. And, finally, your approval of strikes should be viewed as irresponsibility in circumstances of severe political and economic crisis—an irresponsibility that leads to the final anarchy and disintegration of the national economy.

During the elections Russia associated your name with hope for not only the rebirth and independent road in the future, but also for actions in the direction of state unity and popular accord in the present. Since being elected chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet you

have not acquired the political circumspection and worldly wisdom appropriate for this high position, having finally reached the point, in the above mentioned statement, of trampling the national and historical interests of Russia and the Russians. None of your statements fit in the traditional notion people have of national honor and dignity. One should think that the citizens of Russia will decide for themselves what is honor and what is disgrace.

Only a politician who is indifferent to the fate of his Fatherland could hand out right and left free economic zones and sovereignties on the territory of Russia, engaging in fact in dismembering the state of Russia and the single Russian national body. In the aggregate, your actions can only be characterized as aimed at the disintegration of the USSR and the destruction of Russia—neither of which were created by you and therefore their destiny is not to be decided by you. Do you not understand that the destruction of the state wholeness of the Union, to which you—consciously or unconsciously—contribute, will not stop at the borders of Russia; by destroying the country, you and your supporters destroy Russia itself.

[signed] Vasiliy Belov, Eduard Volodin, Valeriy Ganichev, Vladimir Eremenko, Vladimir Krupin, Viktor Likhonosov, Yuriy Loshchits, Sergey Lykoshin, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Valentin Rasputin, Karem Rash, Boris Romanov.

RSFSR Deputy Factions Polled on Views

91UN0800A Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 50,
11-17 Dec 90 pp 6-7

[Unattributed article: "Factions Emerging? The Results of Voting Can Be Predicted, Sociologists Say"]

[Text] The centre of social studies, Rossika, set up by the Social Democratic Association and the Free Labour Party has conducted a comprehensive study of the corps of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation. The sociologists have polled 466 people, that is 44 percent of all deputies and 52 percent of the average number of deputies attending the sittings during the polling.

Political Affiliation

The deputies were asked which political parties they were inclined to support: Nationalists, Conservatives, Christian Democrats, Greens, Liberals, Social Democrats, Socialists or Communists.

Twenty-six percent of the deputies supported Communists, 15 percent—Communists and some other parties, making up a total of 41 percent.

Twenty-two percent of the deputies supported Social Democrats and 14 percent supported Social Democrats and other parties, but the CPSU, making up a total of 36 percent.

Nineteen percent of the deputies supported any parties but the Communists and Social Democrats and 4 percent were unable to specify their political affiliation. A total of 23 percent.

'Social Democrats' and 'Communists'

According to conventional politological criteria, supporters of Communists and Social Democrats were neither Communists nor Social Democrats themselves. The deputies' own opinion of themselves was used as the only criterion for the classification. One of the purposes of the study was to determine the features which are associated by the pollees with the "Communist" and "Social Democratic" stands. "Communists" and "Social Democrats" are of antagonistic viewpoints over three major issues.

1. The Soviet period of this country's history.

The deputies' views on the **October Revolution** were evaluated on the basis of their opinion of that revolution:

a) was it a great progressive event or the main reason behind this country's decline;

b) was it a historical necessity or a historical accident.

Thirty-seven percent of the pollees regard the October Revolution as a progressive event of great historic significance and another 37 percent—as the main reason of the current decline (one percent of the answers were contradictory and 25 percent incoherent).

For 37 percent the October Revolution was a historical necessity, for 40 percent—a historical accident.

The attitude to the October Revolution corresponds to the declared political likes and dislikes. Most "Communists" (70 percent) regard the October Revolution as a historical necessity and great progressive event. Unlike the "Communists" 63-65 percent of Social Democrats see the Revolution as the main reason for this country's woes.

2. Political rivalry

The attitude to the political rivalry was evaluated on the basis of answers to the question of what this country needs most: "Ideological unity of all healthy forces" or "the greatest possible variety of political stands and platforms." Thirty-six percent of the "Communists" favoured unity and only seven percent were for variety of political views. The situation is exactly the opposite among "Social Democrats" (five and 27 percent respectively). Fifty-seven percent of "Communists" and 68 percent of "Social Democrats" gave incoherent or contradictory answers.

The main differences concerned the economic development of the country and were revealed not between "Communists" and "Social Democrats" but between "Communist" managers of plants and the rest of the deputies.

3. Economic reform

The results of the recent voting for the 500-day programme at the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation could have been predicted.

When asked whether they thought **social inequality was natural**, 64 percent of the pollees said "yes," 10 percent said "no," and 26 percent said they were not sure.

When asked whether **competition was the basis of sound economics**, 58 percent said "yes," five percent said "no" and 37 percent said they were not sure.

Fifty-three percent of the pollees unconditionally favoured **encouragement of private enterprise**, 14 percent said the state sector of the economy needed priority encouragement and 33 percent did not give any specific answer.

Fifty-two percent said they believed "foreign capital should be attracted." Twenty-one percent were of the opinion that foreign capital should be used cautiously and 27 percent were indecisive.

Thus, most deputies said they believed the Soviet economy should be based on the same principles as the Western economy: private initiative, competition, openness.

This conclusion is true for the deputy corps as a whole, but behind it there is considerable differentiation on the socio-professional and "party" criteria. Among managers of plants 44 percent and 52 percent favoured private enterprise and attraction of foreign capital respectively. The corresponding figures among "Communists" were 28 percent and 32 percent. "Communists" are more opposed to free economy principles and economic managers are more cautious about these principles than the rest of the deputies.

Novocherkassk 1962 Shooting of 24 Demonstrators Confirmed Officially

91US0242A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 91 p 4

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Bespalov: "Novocherkassk: The Last Secret?"]

[Text] Now, 29 years later, the main secret of the tragic events that took place in Novocherkassk in 1962 has finally been uncovered. Now we know with certainty the places where they secretly buried the innocent victims, people shot during a peaceful rally.

Journalists, people's deputies, and residents of Novocherkassk have been conducting an investigation for over three years now. It was possible to identify those locations even several months ago: They are the village of Martsevo near Taganrog, and old cemeteries in Tarasovskiy Rayon near the city of Novoshakhtinsk. But it was next to impossible to get exact and complete testimonies from eyewitnesses. The few civilians who participated in the secret burials are afraid to tell the truth.

But the Union Procuracy responded to our articles, to the numerous inquiries of people's deputies and of Rostov Oblast and Novocherkassk City Soviets, and it finally declassified the information that had remained secret for three decades. An official letter from the Procuracy to the oblast soviet confirmed that our surmises had been correct.

The first information about the Novocherkassk shooting appeared in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA a year and a half ago. Why then did the Procuracy, the MVD ((Ministry of Internal Affairs)), and the KGB take so long to decide to make public the information that presented no mystery for these agencies from the very beginning?

We do not have to look far for an answer to this if we remember the number of angry letters and newspaper articles that tried to condemn the authors of the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA publication. Generals and colonels who had been directly in charge of the troops in Novocherkassk insisted, full of righteous anger, that there had been no fire on unarmed crowds; there was an accidental round shot from a submachine gun and nothing else. Not more than five people died and not 24 as we stated.

Now we know what these declarations are worth. The commission that was established as instructed by the Rostov Oblast Soviet has the names of all the 24 victims of the shooting at its disposal.

We hope that now we also will be able to receive official confirmation of the names of direct perpetrators and executors of the punitive action. We named these people in our previous articles. We also hope that the Procuracy will finally finish reviewing the criminal cases of those who participated in the Novocherkassk events and were sentenced or executed for "mass disorder."

Crimes before people do not have a limitation period. Everyone who gives an order to shoot at a defenseless crowd and everyone who obeys the order should know now: They will not succeed in keeping their names secret.

Western Republics

Belorussian Communist Party Program Approved

91UN0785A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 7 Dec 90 p 1

[Belorussian CP Party Program: "Concept of the Belorussian Communist Party Program." 31st Belorussian CP Congress was held in Minsk from 28 November 1990 to 1 December 1990]

[Text] I. Lessons of the Past and Tasks of the Future

Soviet Belorussia, like the country as a whole, is at a crucial historical stage. Profound changes that are aimed

at confirming the principles of humanitarianism, democracy, and social justice are being carried out. The political and spiritual emancipation of the people is in progress, and the people's national self-awareness is being reborn. People are acquiring civic dignity and faith in themselves. Passivity and the alienation of man from politics and authority and from the material and cultural riches created by him are being overcome.

The Belorussian Communist Party—a party of socialist choice and communist perspective—is in favor of radical reforms in the republic and supports the platform statement of the 28th CPSU Congress and the strategic course aimed at perestroika.

Since its formation in 1918, the Belorussian Communist Party has become a leading political factor in consolidating the progressive forces and their struggle for the vital interests of the workers. Continuing the cause of October, the Communists, together with the rest of the nation, brought the republic out of its age-old backwardness. A heroic page in the history of Belorussian SSR was written by the Communist Party of Western Belorussia. Thousands of Communists fought bravely against the enemy during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The memory of the sacrifices made by the Belorussian nation and by every Soviet citizen during the hour of the country's severe tests will never die.

It is impossible to cancel the nation's revolutionary gains and labor achievements. Everything that was achieved by Belorussia during the years of the Soviet authority materialized the labor, the will and energy, the patriotism and internationalism of our citizens.

The Belorussian Communist Party is critically evaluating its activity and is profoundly aware of the entire complexity and contradictory nature of the current moment. The processes of revolutionary renewal are occurring in the bitter struggle being waged between the old and the new and are accompanied by the collision of various sociopolitical forces. The social tension is increasing, discipline is falling, and law and order are becoming worse. The economy and the commodity market have been thrown out of balance. The public is alarmed about the state of science, education, culture, and public health.

An extremely negative influence upon the sociopolitical situation in the republic and upon people's mental attitude and moods is being exerted by the consequences of the catastrophe at the Chernobyl AES. The accident has become a nationwide calamity and has put at risk the future of the Belorussian nation.

The prolonged and unjustified secrecy concerning the scope of the accident at the Chernobyl AES on the part of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the union government, and the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the shortage of objective, complete, and accessible information had an effect on the activities of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Buro and the republic's government in achieving the practical resolution of

the questions of overcoming the consequences of the catastrophe and led to serious miscalculations in guaranteeing safe living conditions for the population in the contaminated territory. The party, soviet, and state agencies in the center and in the outlying areas failed to evaluate promptly the scope of what had occurred and delayed in developing and carrying out the necessary measures to guarantee safe living conditions for the population in the contaminated territory.

The complicated situation in which the republic found itself and the deeply underlying roots of the current crisis lie not in the fact that the socialist idea itself is waning, but in those deformations that that idea was subjected to in the past. The Belorussian Communist Party decisively censures the crimes of the Stalin era; rejects the dogmatic approaches to the development of the economy, education, the sciences, and the national culture that occurred; and disassociates itself from any antidemocratic, antihumanitarian means of resolving the problems in the development of society. The Belorussian Communist Party is in favor of the complete elimination of the obsolete methods of administrative fiat; in favor of the changeover to regulated market relations and to economic methods of administering the national economy of Belorussia; in favor of the confirmation in full volume of the individual's rights and freedoms; and in favor of the confirmation of the supremacy of the law.

The Belorussian Communist Party does not remove from itself the political and moral responsibility for the phenomena that were engendered by the deviations from the Leninist principles of constructing socialism, or for the poorly thought-out nature of a number of decisions and actions and the mistakes and miscalculations that were made as recently as the years of perestroika.

In the current complicated situation of the multiplicity of economic and social interests and of political and cultural-ideological currents, the Belorussian Communist Party offers the nation its view of the prospects for the republic's further development. While expressing and defending the workers' interests, it will proceed consistently along the path of creating a humanitarian, democratic socialist society that guarantees complete economic, scientific-technical, and spiritual progress within the channel of world civilization, a society in which the free development of every individual will become a condition for the free development of all, and man will become that society's chief value.

The building of a socialist society is not the embodiment of a ready-made model. It is a constant process of social development, a process that has deep historic roots.

The implementation of the socialist idea is the creation of a law-governed state that is answerable to society, the sole source of the authority of which state is the sovereign will of the people, which is the owner of the land and the means of production, an owner that manages the results of his labor and that confirm in society, through the agencies of the sovereignty of the people, democracy,

a respectful attitude toward the individual, freedom of thought and speech, and the opportunity for every individual to display his capabilities and to implement the plans for his life.

The highest goal of the Belorussian Communist Party is the attainment of the welfare of the people through the creation of an effective economy that is subordinate to the individual's needs, and the guaranteeing, with the changeover to market relations, of social justice and the reliable protection of the workers. Communists are in favor of the real sovereignty of Belorussia as part of the renewed union of sovereign socialist states; the confirmation of the complete sovereignty of the people through the soviets of the people's deputies; and the openness of the republic to the world.

The Belorussian Communist Party is firmly resolved to strive constantly for the set goals exclusively by political means, and will support and defend everyone who, by his honest, conscientious labor, creates the welfare and values of the nation.

II. The Belorussian Communist Party in the Present-Day Political System

1. Renewal and Democratization of the Party

The Belorussian Communist Party sets as its goal the movement toward democratic, humanitarian socialism, and constructs its work on the principles of the creative development of Marxism-Leninism, and its enrichment with the achievements of worldwide social thought.

The Belorussian Communist Party is independent as part of the CPSU. While recognizing the program documents of the CPSU, at the same time it carries out its own Program, carries out a political line that corresponds to the interests and national traditions of the Belorussian nation, and independently resolves the entire set of ideological, organizational, personnel, and financial questions.

The social base of the Belorussian Communist Party is made up of the workers, peasants, and intellectuals who adhere to the idea of building a socialist society.

The Belorussian Communist Party disassociates itself from any functions that are not proper to it; acts in conformity with the Belorussian SSR Constitution and laws; nominates its own representatives to the soviets of people's deputies and to state and public agencies; and forms in them party groups, factions, and interparty blocs. The party wins its vanguard role by its practical deeds in renewing socialist society. It carries out its political course through the primary party organizations, the party committees, and the Communists working in the soviets of people's deputies, economic agencies, labor collectives, and public organizations, by giving full range to the organizing and educational work among the masses.

The Belorussian Communist Party cooperates with, and is ready for creating political blocs with, all the social

organizations, movements, and groups that support the renewal of society on a socialist basis, and is ready for constructive dialogue with various political-ideological currents for resolving the tasks of the political, spiritual, and socioeconomic development of the republic. It wages a political struggle against the forces that discredit the Leninist ideas, that compromise and undermine the socialist system, and that cultivate anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.

The party announces its self-interestedness in preserving the trade-union unity, in strong, authoritative, dynamic trade unions that are capable of defending the workers' rights and interests.

The Belorussian Communist Party sees in the republic's Komsomol an independent sociopolitical youth organization that stands on the same political platform with the Belorussian Communist Party. The Belorussian Communist Party builds its relations with youth organizations and movements with a socialist orientation on principles of dialogue and completely equal partnership, and promotes the renewal of the Komsomol and the strengthening of its authority and vanguard role among the youth.

The Belorussian Communist Party is in favor of the preservation of its party organizations in the Armed Forces, the state security agencies, and the law-enforcement agencies, proceeding from the view that membership in the party not only must not hinder, but, rather, must promote their execution of their functional duties.

The Belorussian Communist Party cooperates with the Communist Parties of the union republics; defends the ideological and organizational unity of the CPSU; develops and improves its ties with the progressive parties and social movements in foreign countries; and is in favor of mutual understanding and peace among nations.

2. Ideological Work

The Belorussian Communist Party sees its very important task in the creative development of the theory and practice of socialism.

The Belorussian Communist Party actively defends the dialectical-materialistic philosophy; propagandizes the ideas, moral and social priorities, and moral values that are inherent to socialist society; and fights to implement them. The party's social ideal absorbs the humanitarian principles of human culture and the age-old striving by the people of labor toward peace and a better life, and absorbs the struggle against any forms of exploitation, coercion, and oppression.

Socialist choice can be implemented only through labor, on the basis of the economic interest of the workers and the labor collectives, through the transmission to the workers of the right of ownership and the guaranteeing of

their participation in state affairs by means of free election to all agencies of authority.

The Belorussian Communist Party will:

- carry out political work on the basis of the consideration of the interests of the individual and of society, proceeding from the real-life situation, the understanding of the constant need for contact with people and the attempt to deal with their material needs and spiritual aspirations;
- confirm industriousness, comradeship, goodness, and a respectful attitude toward legality and the norms of social morality, to the ideals of society for people of labor, where the factors of priority importance are the values that are common to mankind as a whole, where the citizens' rights and political freedoms are strictly observed, where social justice and charity and the protection of the workers are guaranteed, and where all the opportunities exist for the complete spiritual and moral elevation of the individual;
- propagandize the party's ideas that are in consonance with the workers' interests; will attempt to prove, by its practical deeds, the correctness of its policy; and will promote the involvement of people in active participation to renew society;
- expand the range of means and methods of political work that conform to the present-day conditions in the life of society and the party's activity; and will search for new ways to implement socialist values and ideals;
- constantly renew the content, forms, and methods of ideological-educational work; will construct that work on democratic principles, broad glasnost and informational openness, the taking of public opinion into consideration, the rejection of an ideological *diktat*, the free competition of views and ideas, and the use of the exceptional force of conviction, arguments, and moral authority;
- strive to unite around its ideas and policy the best intellectual forces that are capable for forming dynamic, flexible, and untraditional approaches to the resolving of the tasks of perestroika.

3. The Party and the Mass Media

The Belorussian Communist Party has its own newspapers and magazines; engages in publishing activities; and makes dynamic use of radio and television. It builds the relations among the party committees and editorial collectives on complete trust and businesslike cooperation, when free creativity, the journalists' own view of the problems, and broad glasnost combine organically with a thorough knowledge of the situation, with careful political consideration, responsibility, and objectivity.

The Belorussian Communist Party is in favor of the qualitative renewal of the content, and the change in the role and functions of party publications. They have been called upon to reveal and to defend the party positions

with regard to key questions in the life of society, to reflect objectively the processes of its renewal, and to fight for the moral purity of the Communists. In relations among the party committees and their organs of the press, apparatus *diktat* is inadmissible.

The Belorussian Communist Party rejects the use of the mass media to propagandize narrowly selfish and group interests or anticommunist, chauvinistic, and nationalistic ideas. Every word on the pages of newspapers and journals and in television and radio broadcasts must be truthful and convincing, and must be in consonance with the noble goals of society and people's concerns and aspirations.

III. The Sovereignty of Soviet Belorussia, the Socialist Law-Governed State, and True Sovereignty of the People

1. The Sovereignty of the Belorussian SSR

A key question in the activity of the republic's Communist Party is the providing of dynamic assistance to the agencies of authority in confirming the sovereignty of Belorussian SSR as part of the union of sovereign socialist states that is to be created on the basis of the new Union Treaty.

The Belorussian Communist Party supports the declaration entitled "The State Sovereignty of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic," and feels that its fundamental principles must be taken into consideration when the Union Treaty and the new Belorussian SSR Constitution are being drawn up. These two documents, which are of great importance for the fate of the republic and the Union, must express the will of the entire nation of the Belorussian SSR to begin only after they have been discussed by the entire nation.

2. In Favor of a Socialist, Law-Governed State

The Belorussian Communist Party will promote, by its practical deeds, the growth of a socialist law-governed state, the confirmation of the supremacy of the democratically enacted law, and the equality of all to the law, the confirmation of truly humanitarian interrelations among the state, society, and the individual, and their mutual responsibility; will promote the legislative strengthening of the democratic processes in all spheres of life and the putting of the republic's legislation into conformity with the norms of international law.

The Belorussian Communist Party is in favor of:

- the legal consolidation in the new Belorussian SSR Constitution of the complete authority of the soviets of people's deputies, and the unconditional accountability of all state agencies to them;
- the enactment of a Belorussian SSR Law governing referendums and the resolution of the republic's vitally important questions by means of nationwide discussion.

- the establishment of the position of President of Belorussian SSR; the election of the President by all the citizens of the republic on the basis of a universal, equal, and direct franchise, with secret voting;
- increasing the effectiveness of the agencies of authority, and developing varied forms of public self-government;
- the independence of the court and the procuracy; the subordination of them only to the law; the intensification of the role played by the militia, the legal profession, and arbitration in defending the rights and legal interests of citizens and organizations.

The Belorussian Communist Party will strive to improve the moral atmosphere in society, to reinforce everywhere legality and law and order, discipline and responsibility, the acceptance and implementation of effective system-type measures to eradicate crime and other antisocial manifestations.

The Belorussian Communist Party is against any discrimination based on political, religious, or other factors.

The republic's Communist Party deems it necessary to participate in developing and implementing a military reform of the country's Armed Forces, and the conversion of the defense branches with a consideration of the interests of Belorussian SSR; and will defend the unity of the army and the nation and fight to improve the everyday living conditions and social protection of the servicemen and their families.

3. National Consent and Interethnic Relations

The chief goal of the national policy of the Belorussian Communist Party is the completely equal rights of all the republic's citizens irrespective of their nationality, language, and length of time that they lived on the territory of Belorussia; the attainment of the truly international unity of Soviet citizens; the restoration of a respectful attitude to national languages, cultures, traditions, and customs; and the guaranteeing of consent among all citizens.

The Belorussian Communist Party supports the creation of national cultural centers, societies, and groups of persons of the same nationality, the activity of which is aimed at reinforcing the friendship among nations; the development of ties with fellow-countrymen who are living outside the confines of the republic; and the rendering to them of assistance in preserving their native language and culture. It promotes the active introduction of the Belorussian language as a state language into all spheres of social life, and is in favor of the free functioning of the Russian language as a language of communication among ethnic groups.

IV. Man, Society, Social Policy

1. The Rights and Social Protection of Man

The Belorussian Communist Party puts in the center of its policy the creation of the necessary political, economic, social, and spiritual conditions for the complete development and creative self-realization of every citizen of the republic, and is in favor of:

- the unconditional implementation of the constitutional right to work, to receive just payment for that labor on the basis of the final results; the rebirth of the authority of honest, conscientious labor; the encouragement of initiative and enterprise in all spheres of man's activity;
- the creation, under conditions of a market economy, of a mechanism for maintaining the employment rate, for finding jobs for people and providing occupational retraining, and also for compensatory payments during a period of forced temporary unemployment;
- the guaranteeing of healthy and safe conditions on the job; the reduction of the work day; and the increase of the length of vacations in proportion to the increase in labor productivity;
- the guaranteed rise in the population's real income; the improvement of the social security for retirees, disabled persons, orphaned children, families with a large number of children, and other groups of citizens with a low standard of living; the resolution on a first-priority basis of the vitally important problems of war veterans, internationalist fighting men, and persons who have suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe;
- the most rapid elimination of the shortages in the consumer market; the rapid saturation of that market with commodities and services; the maintaining of accessible prices for a number of vital necessities;
- the acceleration of the resolution of the food problem;
- a substantial buildup of the volumes of housing construction, including such construction at the expense of funds provided by enterprises, organizations, farms, cooperatives, and the population's accumulations; the transferral and sale of housing to ownership by the workers;
- a considerable increase in the appropriations to meet the needs of public health; the guaranteeing of the accessibility and high quality of medical assistance provided to the population on the basis of a fundamental reinforcement of the material-technical base; the introduction of a healthy way of life; the development of physical culture and sports;
- the guaranteeing by the state of the social protection of the family and women; the protection of motherhood and childhood; the reduction of the infant mortality rate; the improvement of the conditions for bringing

up children; the overcoming of the shortage of manufactured items and foods for children.

The Belorussian Communist Party takes the most active part in developing a state youth policy, normative acts that create equal start-up opportunities for young people; and confident prospects for the occupational, political, and cultural growth of young men and women.

2. Culture, Education, and Science

The Belorussian Communist Party considers the priority trend in its activity to be the development of culture, education, and science; and is in favor of the further democratization and renewing of a cultural policy and book publishing; the creation of legal and socioeconomic guarantees for development in this sphere of social life. It will actively promote the bringing of the workers closer to spiritual values; the complete revealing of people's talents; the encouragement of the freedom of creativity; the broad use of the cultural heritage in educating people; the creation of an integral system of esthetic education and of an esthetic environment for man; and the broad development of international cultural ties.

While asserting its positions with regard to political philosophy and the right to propagandize scientific materialistic knowledge, the republic's Communist Party supports the principle of the freedom of conscience and of religion; the philanthropic and peace-making activity of the church; the efforts of the church that are aimed at overcoming the phenomena of lack of spirituality; the reinforcement of morality; and the struggle for peace.

The party will always defend the principle of the accessibility of free education as one of the main gains of socialism. It is against the universal putting of culture, art, and education on a commercial basis.

The Belorussian Communist Party will strive for:

- the constant increase in the share of the national income that is channeled into education, culture, and science;
- the development and implementation of the concept of the national school system that is oriented to the worldwide level and that takes into consideration the historical and cultural traditions of the Belorussian nation, its spiritual and moral experience, and the specifics of the republic's national makeup and socioeconomic development;
- the humanizing, democratization, and diversity of instruction and education; the creation of opportunities that are equal for every resident of Belorussia to obtain an education;
- the increase in the social status, authority, and prestige of school teachers, teachers in children's preschool institutions, and all the workers in public education; the improvement of their material support and their everyday living, working, and recreational conditions;
- the radical reform of the higher and secondary special school system; the expansion of its independence; the re-equipping of its material-technical base; the cardinal improvement of the quality of specialist training;
- the increase in the effectiveness and prestige of scientific labor; the creation of a material base of science that corresponds to the worldwide level; the intensification of the social protection of scientists; the integration of science in the academies, the institutions of higher learning, and the branches; the outstripping development of fundamental research; the expansion of the international cooperation provided by Belorussian scientists; and the development of libraries, archives, and information technologies.

The Belorussian Communist Party, together with the creative unions, scientific-research organizations, cultural institutions, educational institutions, publishing houses, and spontaneous public organizations, will work actively to implement the State Program for developing the Belorussian language and the other national languages in Belorussian SSR.

V. For an Effective Economy

1. The Republic's Economic Independence

The Belorussian Communist Party considers one of its most important tasks to be the creation of a highly effective, flexible economy that is responsive to scientific-technical progress, that is oriented toward the complete satisfying of the material and social needs of the republic's population.

It is in favor of:

- the Belorussian nation's ownership of the land, its mineral wealth, domestic resources, vegetable and animal kingdom, and other natural wealth, and also the enterprises, associations, organizations, and institutions in the food-production and social sphere that are currently in operation and that are to be newly created on the territory of Belorussian SSR;
- the republic's right independently to make decisions that regulate socioeconomic relations; the economic mechanism and organizational structure of administration; an investment policy; the location of the productive forces and structures in the social infrastructure; and the resolution of other questions linked with the present and future in the economy of Belorussian SSR;
- an independent, flexible finance-and-credit and taxation policy that is aimed at raising the population's standard of living; the accelerated development of the republic, its oblasts, cities, and rayons; the reliable financial support of local self-government; the introduction of the achievements of scientific-technical progress and of environmental-protection measures;

- the voluntary transfer to the jurisdiction of union agencies of state authority and administration and to the sphere of joint jurisdiction only those questions of social and cultural construction that affect the common interests of the peoples of our country;
- the carrying out of a radical economic reform on principles of self-government, economic independence, and the complete power of the soviets;
- the entering into direct economic and cultural relations with the union republics, and the conclusion of the necessary bilateral and multilateral agreements that do not contradict the interests of the country or the other union republics;
- the establishment of interrelationships with foreign states; the participation of foreign-economic ties and the activities of international organizations.

2. Restructuring of the National Economy

The Belorussian Communist Party deems it necessary to carry out a restructuring of the economy that is aimed at:

- the re-orientation of production toward the maximum saturation of the consumer market; the active involvement of enterprises and organizations and of the defense branches of industry in the production of technically complicated articles intended for cultural and everyday use, medical equipment, and equipment for the branches in the social sphere;
- the intensive development of science and scientific-technical progress; the introduction of production entities that conserve resources, that are ecologically safe, and that produce no waste products; the guaranteeing of the continuous modernization of the manufacturing and construction industries and of transportation;
- the development of small enterprises and organizations, cooperatives, and leased collectives in industry, construction, and the services sphere; the creation of peasant farms and subsidiary farms, agroindustrial associations, agrocompanies, agrocombines, and other production formations that make it possible to eliminate the existing monopoly-type structures and to guarantee competitiveness and the healthy competition among the commodity producers and their economic independence.

3. Market Economy

The Belorussian Communist Party is in favor of the gradual changeover to regulated market relations, provided steps and guarantees are taken to assure the social protection of the population and there is a strengthening of the socialist type of economy. It will promote:

- the establishment and development of various types of ownership and of entrepreneurial activity that preclude any forms of exploitation, with the decisive role played by public ownership as the basis of the socialist

essence of Soviet society; the creation of equal economic management conditions for state, joint-stock, cooperative, and other enterprises;

- the granting of broad rights to producers in the free sale of their output and services on the basis of contract relations with their consumers;
- the guaranteeing of the optimal combination of market and state mechanisms for administering economic activity on the basis of the restructuring of planning, the taxation and credit-and-finance policy, monetary circulation, material-technical support, and foreign-economic activity;
- the carrying out of a flexible policy of pricing; the creation of a mechanism for compensating for the population's losses as a result of the reconsideration of retail prices and the system of indexing the monetary income of the inhabitants of Belorussia depending upon the rise in consumer prices;
- the providing of economic incentives for productive and high-quality labor; the reinforcement of order and discipline in the production area by increasing the individual's economic self-interestedness in achieving high results;
- the implementation of measures to prevent a production slump, especially in the branches that determine technical progress, which measures are intended to increase the production of consumer goods, food products, and services; the reinforcement of the domestic commodity market by redistributing shipments of the necessary commodities to nonmarket needs and export.

4. Agrarian Policy

The Belorussian Communist Party is opposed to the establishment of private ownership of the land. It is in favor of the uncompensated transfer of the land for use, with inheritance rights, to those who work on it.

The Belorussian Communist Party considers the chief trends in the agrarian policy to be:

- the fundamental improvement of the status of the peasantry; the assertion that the peasants are the true owner of the land and the results of their labor;
- the creation of equal economic conditions for all forms of management in rural areas: kolkhozes, sovkhoses, agroindustrial associations, agrocompanies, agrocombines, cooperatives, agroindustrial associations, and peasant and subsidiary farms;
- the consistent reinforcement of the material-technical base of agricultural production and the processing branches; the broad application of the achievements of science and advanced experience and of technological schemes that conserve resources and have no waste products;

- the creation in the rural areas of a highly developed social infrastructure; the buildup of the volumes of housing construction; the granting to every rural family of the opportunity to have its own separate well-equipped apartment or home; the considerable expansion of the network of hard-surfaced roads;
- the intensification of the aid provided to rural inhabitants in managing their private subsidiary plots; the development of subsidiary production entities and hand trades for expanding the sphere of application of labor in rural localities; the carrying out of a preferential tax policy with respect to agricultural workers;
- the providing to the republic with ecologically pure food products; the unification of the efforts of the countryside and the city in resolving the food tasks; the achievement of equivalency in the economic relations between them.

5. Ecological Policy

Belorussian Communists, sharing with the rest of the Belorussian nation the severe consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe, realize that a lot of work will be required to resettle people, to improve the environment, and to preserve the health of the republic's inhabitants.

Attaching exceptional importance to the resolution of the ecological problems in the interests of the present and future generations, the Belorussian Communist Party will strive for:

- the unconditional fulfillment of the State Program to eliminate in the republic the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES; the providing of broad information concerning the work being done and the radiation situation in the places where people live and work;
- the organizing of international cooperation to eliminate the consequences of the accident and to improve the health of the republic's population;
- the complete compensation by the state for the losses and costs borne by the people living in the contaminated rayons who are resettling to a new place of residence;
- the carrying out of well-publicized people's control over the expenditure of monetary funds and material resources that are aimed at eliminating the consequences of the accident;
- the resolution of any questions of the republic's political, economic, and social life only with a consideration of the fact that it is a national ecological disaster zone;
- the taking of urgent steps to improve the ecological situation in the cities of Mogilev, Novopolotsk, Gomel, Grodno, Bobruysk, Sengorsk, Svetlogorsk, Minsk, and other inhabited places;

- the improvement of the economic mechanism of use of the environment, which mechanism is based on the introduction of payment for the use of natural resources and for the pollution of the environment;
- the creation in the republic of ecologically safe agricultural production; the efficient use of the natural wealth;
- the reduction of the dumping of raw industrial runoff into bodies of water; the reduction of the spewing of noxious substances into the atmosphere; the change-over of the republic's industry to ecologically pure technological schemes;
- the well-publicized discussion of the programs and construction plans for building in the republic large-scale industrial structures that affect the fundamental interests of the population and that exert an influence on the environment; the formation of independent groups of experts on matters of the ecology; and the effective monitoring of the ecological situation.

The Belorussian Communist Party will cooperate with all public movements and organizations that make a specific contribution to the protection and improvement of the environment, and to the creation of an ecologically pure Belorussia.

The Belorussian Communist Party appeals to all the republic's citizens who are attempting to live in a democratic, humanitarian socialist society to support the Belorussian Communist Party Program and all its work for the well-being of the Belorussian nation, in the name of the future of Soviet Belorussia as part of a union of sovereign socialist states.

Proceedings of 31st Belorussian CP Congress

Belorussian CP Resolution Encourages Party Participation in Soviets

91UN06514 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 9 Dec 90 p 3

[Resolution of the 31st Belorussian CP Congress: "On the Work of Communists in the Soviets of People's Deputies"; the 31st Belorussian CP Congress was held in Minsk 28 November - 1 December 1990.]

[Text] The Belorussian CP Congress notes that measures are being carried out in the republic to implement the reform of the political system, delimit the functions of party and soviet agencies, and establish effective conditions for turning the soviets of people's deputies into agencies of genuine popular sovereignty. A good many active and competent people who firmly support socialist positions have been elected to the soviets. The majority of them are members of the CPSU.

At the same time, in the course of the latest election campaign many party committees and organizations

acted in an uncoordinated fashion, and the election campaign tactics were not thoroughly thought through in a number of places.

The activities of Communists in the soviets cannot be deemed adequate; it requires comprehensive critical analysis, conclusions and radical improvement.

While constituting the majority in the soviets, Communists have not yet been able to get the bodies of authority to correctly define priorities in their activities, to ensure the solution of their regions' vitally important problems, and to quit wasting valuable time on secondary issues.

Communists have inadequately contributed to surmounting the atmosphere of confrontation among deputy groups that has been developing in a number of soviets, along with public-rally forms of work.

Individual Communist deputies have been making themselves independent of party organizations and do not consider the implementation of party decisions to be mandatory. Party groups have not been established in all soviets. Because of passivity and the failure to coordinate actions, a vacuum of political influence is being created that is being filled by forces striving for destruction of the socialist state's socioeconomic and legal foundations.

The soviets of people's deputies are the sole legitimate authority in Soviet Belorussia. The Belorussian Communist Party actively supports them. The republic's Communists will provide the soviets with practical assistance in the development of self-government and expansion of the working people's participation in the work of all bodies of state authority and administration.

At the same time, Communists intend to publicly criticize the decisions of soviets and their executive bodies that are contrary to the people's interests, to act as active opponents and a constructive opposition, to submit and defend alternative proposals that are capable of implementing socialist principles through the soviets, and to work to ensure social justice and the protection of working people.

The congress favors establishing the necessary legal, material and financial basis for the soviets that will support their real authority. Belorussia's Communists will continue to work to achieve broad representation in the soviets, relying on the trust and support of workers, peasants, the intelligentsia and all strata of the republic's population, and to put forward effective and real socioeconomic and political programs that are in keeping with the people's fundamental interests. In the course of the election campaign the communists have acted on the basis of democratic principles and Soviet laws.

The congress believes that at the present stage of society's political development the renewal and stepping up of the work of Communist deputies and party formations in the soviets are an extremely important function

of the Belorussian Communist Party and of its party committees and organizations.

Communists elected to soviets of people's deputies and serving on state agencies should utilize all measures provided by legislation to support stability in society and to prevent instances of illegality and infringement on citizens' rights.

The congress favors the utilizations of various ways and forms of organizing constructive work by the soviets of people's deputies and of enhancing the consolidating tendency in legislative work, in the joint resolution of practical issues, and in the implementation of voters' directives. Communists will strive to have the drafts of key legislative acts efficiently processed in the soviets' party groups and factions and in labor collectives, in order that constituents' interests might be reflected in them as fully as possible.

Communists will support the development and efficient operation in the soviets of a mechanism of consultations with scholars; the executives and specialists of enterprises, organizations and farms; trade-union and Komsomol organizations; and progressive social movements on the key problems that demand solution, and will submit drafts on these issues to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and local soviets by way of legislative or political initiative.

The Belorussian CP Congress deems it advisable to coordinate the action of party agencies and Communist deputies, ensuring that they are systematically informed about the priority tasks of the Belorussian Communist Party and regional party organizations and about the situation in the party and the implementation of decisions that have been made, providing them with the necessary assistance in professional and political growth and training in the forms and methods of parliamentary work, and utilizing the intellectual potential of the Belorussian Communist Party to this end.

The Belorussian CP Congress stresses the need to sharply increase the discipline and organization of Communist deputies during the time sessions are at work, and also in the fulfillment of their deputies' duties in election districts.

Party organizations are required to strengthen their monitoring of the reports of Communist deputies in election districts and labor collectives.

It is deemed advisable to establish in the apparatus of the Belorussian CP Central Committee a structural subdivision for dealing with the Belorussian Communist Party's cooperation with the soviets of people's deputies and other public political formations.

Belorussian CP Resolution Defines Tactics of Party Activity

91UN0651B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA
in Russian 8 Dec 90 p 1

[Resolution of the 31st Belorussian CP Congress: "On the Distinguishing Characteristics of the Belorussian Communist Party's Tactics Under Present Conditions"]

[Text] The congress notes that in connection with the drastic change in the conditions of the activities of the republic Communist Party that has been caused by the restructuring of economic, social and political structures, the exacerbation of many contradictions in society, and the intensification of political struggle, it is necessary to radically update its tactical principles and means and methods of activity.

The Belorussian Communist Party's tactics should be based, first and foremost, on a thorough analysis of the situation and the alignment of social and political forces and movements, and flexibility and resolve in actions.

The congress believes that the principal distinguishing features of the tactics of the republic Communist Party's organizations and committees under present conditions are as follows:

1. In implementing the policy of the Belorussian CP as a party expressing and defending the interests of the working people.

To organize the systematic study of public opinion, to detect people's attitudes in a timely and correct fashion, to identify the problems that arouse the greatest interest, and to submit them for discussion by Communists, including discussion in bodies of state authority.

To formulate a clear-cut position of party organizations and committees concerning the changeover to new forms of economic relations. To promote those forms that develop in the republic's economy, in addition to state ownership, other forms of ownership, especially collective ownership; and to oppose the sort of privatization of ownership that could result in the enrichment of only a relatively small part of the population and in a sharp stratification of people in terms of property.

To defend the principle of social justice. To put forward initiatives and support measures for creating conditions to encourage talent, industriousness and a high degree of interest in the results of work, and also for providing assistance to those who cannot work at full strength: pensioners, disabled persons, students, large families, and low-income strata of the population. At the same time, to oppose attempts, no matter who they come from, to put the costs and difficulties of the period of transition to the market chiefly on the working people. Any decision affecting their interests should be considered in party organizations and labor collectives.

In their daily activities, it is important for party organizations and committees at all levels to take into account

the specific features of individual social segments and groups of the population, and to approach them in a differentiated fashion.

To follow a line of enhancing workers and peasants' social status and their role in the republic's political life. To vigorously combat attempts to separate the party from the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia. To strive for Communists' direct participation in the work of various forms of the working people's self-government. To actively advocate the Belorussian Communist Party's political line in them.

To utilize all possibilities for close cooperation with the intelligentsia, to assist in the satisfaction of its professional, intellectual and spiritual requirements, and to enlist it more broadly in the accomplishment of political tasks.

An extremely important issue of tactics is the preservation and reinforcement of the party's positions in labor collectives. It is necessary to conduct matters in such a fashion that enterprise executives, the councils of labor collectives and public formations themselves seek support from the party organization and turn to it for advice. To establish economic commissions and expert groups on individual issues, and to enlist young people in their work.

To develop and propose to labor collectives their own organizational measures and other measures for the social and economic development of enterprises and organizations.

To actively involve themselves in elucidating the goals and objectives of the form of economic activity that is most acceptable to a given collective, defending the need for the social protection of its employees, and urging the management and trade-union committees to implement corresponding measures. Not to interfere in the management's managerial activities.

To provide assistance in developing economic and social policies that are in the working people's interests in the sphere of the newly developing entrepreneurship that is being carried out on the basis of cooperative, joint-stock and private forms of ownership, through Communists' participation in the work of the boards and councils of such enterprises and organizations, and the establishment of Belorussian CP organizations in them where possible.

In personnel matters, to act on the basis of a collectively developed position that is oriented toward the advancement of capable people and not just toward participation in selection and recommendation, but toward the provision of specific assistance to personnel. To work to master the election mechanism and acquire the ability to create a favorable public atmosphere around people who are supported by Belorussian CP organizations and committees.

Relying on the constitutions of the country and the republic, the USSR Law on Public Organizations, and international legal acts on matters of human rights, to disclose the true goal of the idea of the depoliticization of enterprises and organizations, state and law-enforcement agencies, the KGB and the army; to resolutely resist attempts to force party committees and organizations out of labor collectives; and to defend Communists' right to engage in political activity.

2. In providing political leadership in society under the conditions of a multiparty system.

To persistently work to master the nuances of parliamentary struggle, working through democratic means to achieve the maximum representation of the Belorussian CP on soviets, mutual understanding with the people's elected representatives, and the cohesiveness of Communist deputies.

To seek common interests with the public political movements and organizations that are emerging in the republic. To identify potential political allies among them. To strive for close cooperation with those of them who take constructive positions, establishing contacts on both republic and local levels.

To utilize the practice of meetings, round tables, discussions, participation in congresses, rallies and demonstrations, and other activities conducted by new parties and movements for expounding their position and consolidating the forces of politically active people.

To deem possible the participation of Communists in the activities of public political movements if it contributes to the cohesion of healthy democratic forces in them and does not cause an erosion of the fundamental positions of the Belorussian CP and CPSU.

Emphasis should be placed on respect for the independence of trade-union and other public organizations and the avoidance of issuing direct orders to them by party committees and organizations. At the same time, Communists have the right to express their viewpoint on the decisions made by those organizations and to submit alternatives for their consideration.

To strengthen ties and develop cooperation with young-people's and women's movements and with veterans' organizations, and to contribute to the realization of their demands.

To take a respectful attitude toward the activities of cultural, educational, national-cultural and religious associations and organizations in the spiritual, cultural and moral upbringing of people.

To work to get more CPSU members elected to various public bodies. To show tactfulness toward such Communists, keeping in mind that they are accountable both to those who have elected them and to party organizations.

The top priority task of the Belorussian Communist Party's present tactics is to increase the emphasis on

political work at people's places of residence, and to enhance the activeness of existing party organizations of housing-management administrations and rural soviets.

When necessary, to establish, under party raykoms and gorkoms, public self-government committees, and housing-management administrations, territorial party organizations that will unite Communists who, by the nature of their official duties, have regular contacts with the population; to assign experienced organizers and propagandists to them from labor collectives; and to put the secretaries of party committees and employees of the party apparatus on their rolls.

To work toward the inclusion of Communists on bodies of local government.

To assist all deputies, regardless of their party affiliation, who act in the interests of the public. To work to direct public opinion toward a negative perception of demagoguery and political expediency. To present initiatives to recall deputies who do not justify their constituents' confidence.

To organize cooperation among territorial party organizations and party factions in the soviets, as well as cooperation with the party organizations of military units located within the given election districts.

To participate in activities conducted at places of residence, and to organize their own activities pertaining to everyday life and activities of a cultural and political nature.

To work to master the skills of active, aggressive agitational work. To wage propaganda for their ideas, enter debates and fight for public opinion and for persuading people of the correctness of the party's policy.

To create every condition for Communists who possess talent as propagandists and agitators to exercise their abilities. To organize and coordinate scientists and public-affairs writers who are capable of defending and creatively developing the theory of socialism and of rebuffing attempts to present the history of our state, republic and party, and the historical process as a whole in a distorted form.

To work to ensure the personal participation of party leaders of all ranks in propaganda and agitational work among the population.

To teach Communists to engage in polemics, clearly expound their positions, and shape and develop their political culture. To utilize, for this end, public political centers, party discussion clubs, and the party educational system.

To provide Communists with complete and objective information on various questions, and to organize timely feedback.

To demand from appropriate agencies that persons who publicly insult and slander Communists, the republic

Communist Party and the CPSU be brought to account. To react in prompt fashion through the mass news media to the actions of forces that are locked in irreconcilable confrontation with the Communist Party and are urging the disruption of civil peace and accord.

To insist on the clear and consistent expression by party publications of the position of the party committees whose organs they are. To contribute to their effectively assisting party organizations in defining the forms, means and methods of accomplishing the tasks at hand, and studying and compiling the opinion of Communists and all working people.

To actively utilize other mass news media, to provide objective and reliable information concerning their activities through them, and to advocate the party line through Communists working for them.

To provide comprehensive support in disseminating party publications among Communists and nonmembers of the party, in establishing readers' clubs, and in organizing discussion of the most topically important published items.

3. In forming relations of democracy, mutual trust and exactingness, and party comradeship.

To call special attention to the fulfillment by Communists of the party's program and statutory requirements, the study and dissemination of new, up-to-date forms and methods of party work, the increasing of political activeness, and the enhancement of the party's prestige through personal conduct, conscientious work and the observance of moral norms.

In elective bodies, to make decisions on key problems after they have been worked through and assessed in primary and shop party organizations and on councils of party organization secretaries, and on the basis of a study of Communists' opinion.

Not to lower standards for admission to the party. In this connection, not to single out any one social group, but also not to lose the orientation toward the admission of workers to the party.

To discuss questions connected with withdrawal from the party in a frank and principled fashion in party organizations and committees. To judge persons who are withdrawing from the CPSU of their own will in a differentiated fashion, depending on the motives for their action, without pitting anyone against the party organization. Not to engage in attempts to persuade those who have broken with the communist idea and assumed anticommunist positions, but to converse purposefully with each of them. To cooperate with those who may have become confused in the present situation but continue to sympathize with the Belorussian CP's goals and objectives, and not to close off the possibility of their returning to the party.

To show the maximum tactfulness and patience toward wavering party members, and to proceed on the assumption that they are not to blame for their wavering and that, having lost their ideological and philosophical guideposts, they have lost faith not in the socialist ideal but in the possibility of realizing it. To work persistently to eliminate this oversight in party work.

To work to establish and support the spirit of comradeship, goodwill and mutual assistance in the party milieu. To work to eliminate any grounds for mistrust in relations among Communists and between the party masses and their elective bodies and the party apparatus. To prevent manifestations of inequality among party members based on the positions they hold, and to provide no cause for criticism of leadership personnel for the enjoyment of illegitimate privileges or the manifestation of immodesty in dealing with personal matters.

To resolve all questions connected with party property in an open fashion. To develop the economic activities of party organizations in such a fashion that it can finance the maintenance of party employees and the provision of social protection for low-income families of Communists and needy party veterans.

To provide the necessary moral and material assistance to Communists in public activities, and to provide them with legal and political protection in the event of the violation of their civil rights.

To work for the observance of guarantees of the social protection of the elective party aktiv, and for enhancement of the status of the secretaries of party organizations.

Belorussian CP Resolution on Party Relations With Political Movements

91UN0651C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 8 Dec 90 p 2

[Resolution of the 31st Belorussian CP Congress: "On the Position of the Belorussian Communist Party in Relations With Public Political Organizations and Movements"]

[Text] Perestroika has aroused millions of Soviet people to active participation in public and political activities. In Belorussia new public movements and organizations are being formed that represent diverse social strata and groups of society and are characterized by a wide political spectrum: from socialist orientation to a general democratic orientation, from a centrist position to one oriented toward the values of bourgeois society. Some leaders of public organizations, especially of the Belorussian People's Front, taking advantage of existing difficulties and people's discontent with the deterioration of living conditions, have launched anticommunist hysteria and are urging the population and young people toward unlawful, violent actions. They are taking advantage of social tension and confrontation to struggle for power.

Under these conditions, the 31st Congress of the Belorussian Communist Party demands that party organizations and all Communists utilize their influence and political experience for the resolute defense of the CPSU and Belorussian CP, V. I. Lenin, and the people's socialist choice, and that they work toward the end that perestroika develop without confrontation and in the interests of all social strata and national groups of the republic's population, and that it guarantee all citizens and their organizations freedom of public and political activity in accordance with Soviet laws and international norms.

Communists are convinced that the path toward a civil society and economically strong state based on the rule of law lies only through consolidation and the unity and concerted work of all organizations and movements that are sincerely interested in solving the specific problems of the republic and of each of its inhabitants.

The congress declares that the Belorussian Communist Party is open to cooperation with organizations and movements of socialist, humanistic and democratic orientation, and is prepared to create an alliance of Belorussia's leftist forces and to cooperate with them in the soviets of people's deputies.

Working to revive in society the spirit of activeness and business initiative, the Belorussian Communist Party will cooperate with independent trade unions, take part in the growing workers', peasants' and women' movements, and support their constructive efforts for the social protection of the working people.

The Belorussian Communist Party favors equal relations with the Komsomol and other young people's organizations on the basis of respect for their autonomy, independence and statutes, and for the norms of interalliance life.

The Belorussian Communist Party will actively cooperate with public formations that contribute to the growth in national consciousness, preservation of the uniqueness of the Belorussian people, and the preservation and dissemination of cultural values.

The congress believes that CPSU members may take part in mass movements operating within the framework of the USSR Constitution and the BSSR Constitution, and may foster their progressive orientation.

At the same time the congress declares that Communists will actively oppose the activities of destructive and extremist forces that inflame social, national and religious enmity and incite people to violent acts in counting on a nonconstitutional path to power.

The congress appeals to all public organizations and movements to abandon fruitless confrontation, cast aside all offenses, rid themselves of mistrust, and move on to joint actions and constructive cooperation in the interests of the humane goals of perestroika, civil peace

and accord, the ensuring of human rights, and implementation of the program for leading society out of crisis. The pressing interests of the people of Soviet Belorussia, and not political ambitions and ideological dogmas, should be the point of departure for our cooperation.

We propose concerted cooperation in carrying out the changeover to a socially oriented market economy, in developing a new Union Treaty, and in improving interethnic relations. We favor accord on such important problems as the development of a rule-of-law state and a civil society, favor the moral and spiritual development of the peoples inhabiting Belorussia on the basis of national traditions and the world humanistic legacy, and favor protection of the environment and elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

The Belorussian Communist Party proposes the following principles of honest partnership relations to the political parties and movements:

- respect for individual rights, liberties and dignity;
- recognition of the people's choice as the sole source of political authority;
- the repudiation of violence and revenge as means and ends of political struggle;
- decency in relations and polemics;
- competition among independent and equal political forces.

The congress deems it necessary to recommend that all Belorussian CP party organizations develop a dialogue with public political organizations and tendencies, the exchange of opinions, consultations, informational meetings and conferences, round tables, public debates, and other forms of cooperation that make it possible better to know and understand one's political partners and to identify possible points of contact and agreement.

The congress proposes that the editorial staffs of party newspapers and magazines continuously treat the problems of the CPSU and Belorussian CP's relations with public political associations.

The congress is counting on the prospect that the Belorussian Communist Party's noble political goals will be supported by all the republic's democratic forces that favor the socioeconomic and spiritual renewal of our socialist society.

Belorussian First Secretary Candidate Assesses 31st Party Congress

91UN0651D Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA
in Russian 8 Dec 90 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Ignatyevich Brovnikov, conducted by Z. Prigodich: "—Successes Along the Paths of Renewal"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Vladimir Ignatyevich Brovikov is well known in the republic. He has previously served as secretary of the Vitebsk Party Obkom, second secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, and chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers. In recent years he was USSR Ambassador to Poland. Two of his speeches at plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, which in a bold and Party-minded, uncompromising fashion, revealed serious shortcomings in the protracted process of perestroika, were received with approval by the public at large. It is no accident, therefore, that at the 31st Belorussian CP Congress the name of V. I. Brovikov was presented among other candidates for the office of first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee. Our newspaper's readers already know: Vladimir Ignatyevich lost the election. With what thoughts and feelings did he leave the congress?

"My mood, on the whole, is okay," said V. I. Brovikov. "I am not inclined to dramatize the results of the voting. After the first round of voting, when A. A. Malofeyev and I got the greatest number of votes and entered the second round, it was already clear that neither of us would win a brilliant victory or suffer a crushing defeat. And that's how things came out. In principle, I am not distressed with my own rating of 46 percent. And I am even, I might say, satisfied. Especially if one considers that I have worked outside the republic in recent years, while most of the people who were voting entered political life precisely in recent times.

"So I consider the results perfectly normal. Granted, they do not flatter my pride very much, but they do not wound it very much, either. I have nothing and no one at which to take offense. I am sincerely grateful to those delegates who voted for my candidacy, and I do not feel even the shadow of offense toward those who gave their preference to Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Malofeyev."

[Prigodich] Do you consider the election outcome legitimate and sufficiently objective?

[Brovikov] Completely. And I say that with absolute sincerity. Anatoliy Aleksandrovich is, without the least doubt, a worthy person. And a very strong party official. Right after the election I congratulated him with his victory and with all my heart wished him success in the tremendous and extremely difficult work that awaits him in the office of leader of the republic party organization and that, moreover, will be carried out under extremely difficult and, perhaps, sometimes even dramatic conditions.

[Prigodich] What could you note as A. A. Malofeyev's strongest qualities. After all, you have met with him more than once and seen him, so to speak, directly in action.

[Brovikov] Yes, during my tenure as second secretary of the Central Committee I did, in fact, work with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich rather often. At that time he was serving as chairman of the Gomel Oblast Ispolkom, and he and I would travel around the oblast together, meet with

people and discuss all our affairs and concerns. So, most likely, I have the right to say that I know him fairly well.

Now, about his qualities. You understand that there are people who superficially look paler than they are in actual reality. It seems to me that Anatoliy Aleksandrovich is such a person. To someone who does not know him well he might seem like a rather dry and, in some respects, even a somewhat one-dimensional person. But that is only a superficial impression. In reality he is very responsive and emotional. He has a high degree of political sophistication. He is a splendid organizer and always consistent in his actions. And perhaps the most importantly, he is very kind toward people. In a party official I value this quality above all. This quality is necessary to any executive, especially one of high rank. For considerable power is given, and one must use this powerful and sharp weapon very cautiously. In the party we still are dealing primarily with comrades who may think differently but are marching in one direction toward a common goal. Here the feeling of comradeship should be invariable. Anatoliy Aleksandrovich fully possesses this feeling. And I would wish that it not be extinguished in him.

[Prigodich] What could you say about your other rivals?

[Brovikov] Well, I would probably not call them rivals. We are more comrades-in-arms in a common cause. I have personally known S. Kamay and V. V. Grigoryev for a good 10 years; I know their strong and weak sides and always have regarded them, and still regard them with profound respect. In some respects they are different people, each with their own character, temperament and work style. But they have in common the main thing—honest, self-sacrifice and an unconditional devotion to the cause. Therefore, it was painful for me to hear unfair remarks directed at A. S. Kamay. After all, I myself am from Gomel Oblast and often visit there, and when the Chernobyl disaster occurred, I saw him practically crawling over the radionuclide-contaminated earth. That alone evokes respect. And now there are people who are attempting to hold all that against him.

Of course, Aleksey Stepanovich also has made mistakes. But I am convinced that they came not from careerist considerations, but from the best of motives. This person is incapable of baseness. He is not to blame for Chernobyl, because he found himself a hostage of many circumstances, and in those circumstances he did everything that he could. I say this in no uncertain terms.

The candidacy of V. V. Grigoryev, the youngest of us four, was also a worthy one. He is a very well-prepared person with a broad outlook. Moreover, Vladimir Viktorovich has also had solid experience in practical work. Therefore, I see him as an extremely promising official.

[Prigodich] Vladimir Ignatyevich, how do you assess the work of our congress as a whole?

[Brovikov] Attending its sessions and being at the center of many disputes in the corridors, I became convinced

with great joy that the Belorussian Communist Party is not just alive but politically healthy. I heard passionate words of conviction, sober and objective assessments, and trenchant and candid judgments pertaining to both our past and our future. Moreover, that pertains not just to the report but to most of the speeches by delegates.

I am also profoundly satisfied that the congress approached the development of tasks for the future with tremendous responsibility. Heated debates arose not just over the concept of any given document as a whole, but over each of its points. That gave me a sense of optimism.

The situation in the republic right now is a little better than in other regions of the country, but it is worrying that it also has a tendency toward deterioration. To the delegates' credit, they were sufficiently critical and, it seems to me, objectively assessed the present sociopolitical and economic situation. That means that the program that has been developed should be realistic and effective. All this makes it possible to hope that Belorussia's party organization, having regrouped its ranks and mobilized its internal reserves, will be able to stabilize the situation and lead the republic out of crisis.

[Prigodich] Since the subject of crisis has come up, I would like to know your opinion on two currently fashionable things proposed as absolutely fundamental means of overcoming the crisis situation. They are private property and the market.

[Brovikov] I favor market forms of property. But I am categorically opposed to selling land into private hands. This position was taken not just by Marxists and Leninist Bolsheviks, but by the Russian land's great writer Lev Tolstoy. Read his letters to Stolypin—with what passion and conviction he argues the impossibility of selling off wealth that belongs to the people as a whole, and attempts to show the ruinousness of that path, which would lead to the end of freedom, to physical and moral slavery.

As for the market, here it is hard to give an unequivocal answer. Of course, we failed to duly appreciate market relations under the conditions of a socialist economy, and I consider it right that we are returning to them today. But the market should exist precisely under the conditions of a socialist economy. Yet some hotheads, having visited the West and experienced the magical effect of its overflowing store shelves, are proposing rather to repudiate everything that we have gained and achieved through our work, and to embark on the path to capitalism as fast as possible. That is, at the very least, an illusion. No, capitalism will not save us; it will only exacerbate and already explosive social situation to the limit.

We must, unquestionably, move toward the market. But that movement should be accompanied by the improvement of people's material and spiritual well-being. And so far life is getting steadily worse and worse. We have already gone to capitalism without outstretched hands—

give us food, provide for our disabled and our children. A humiliating situation! We never stooped to that, not even in the cursed past that we berate today in every way we can.

You understand that the market is too serious to be regarded with the sort of careless ease and haste that we are regarding it. A situation in which only money is not in short supply is extremely dangerous.

I think that here, as always, we are making one mistake: we have seized on the idea of the market with exceptional enthusiasm, as a panacea that will save us from all our woes. What has been seized on with enthusiasm may not be bad, and may even be good. But it would be better if the new economic policy were combined with a sufficiently serious scientific prediction, a necessary forecast and consideration of the potential social consequences. But none of that exists. We are rushing into the maelstrom of the market at breakneck speed. What's important for us is to "engage in combat" as soon as possible, and then sort things out and count up our losses. No, that sort of approach is not for serious politics.

[Prigodich] And how thoughtfully and carefully are we approaching transformations in the purely political and ideological sphere?

[Brovikov] To put the matter briefly, I would not want us to take the Polish path here. During all four years of my work there, our Polish friends tried to convince me that they were true Marxists-Leninists, infected with the idea of socialist renewal. But under that flag, under socialist phraseology, the politics of betrayal were hiding. The Polish United Workers' Party continually yielded position after position, and then in the end it fell apart and gave up power to the opposition. That was a radical reversal, because a situation was created in which the ruling party of its own will went over to the position of an opposition, and conversely, the opposition party (I consider Solidarity a party) seized power and became the ruling party.

I shall say frankly that I do not see sufficient guarantees that such a situation cannot happen in our country, because we have an opposition and it, also, is in substantial part antisocialist. Yet instead of principled attitudes toward the opposition, we have been trying to casually flirt with it. Either we slightly fear it, or we want to oblige it by showing that we, too, are clever and sufficiently free-thinking. And we are simply yielding our positions and not defending our ideals. A real threat of degeneration is arising. At least I, as a Communist, am very offended and worried that the party's positions find themselves extremely pressed. And what is most offensive of all is that this has been done with the tacit consent of the party itself.

[Prigodich] Vladimir Ignatyevich, let's turn to yet another problem raised at our congress. In the speeches of some delegates, harsh criticism was leveled at the Central Committee and other party committees for

having failed to give sufficient attention to the development of national culture and revival of the Belorussian people's spiritual legacy. In your opinion, to what extent is such criticism justified?

[Brovikov] What I can say is... Even though I am presently living in Moscow, I have enough information to reach my own conclusions. Truly, the previous leadership did not manage to find a common language with the intelligentsia. And whether this is a fault or a misfortune will probably never be understood. But that was perhaps the weakest side of the work of the previous central committee and its apparatus.

What did I feel at the congress? Some party leaders, knowing that sin on their own part, lavished too many compliments on the intelligentsia. I did not like that. Why? It is bad when we show disregard for the creative intelligentsia, but it is even worse when we try to ingratiate ourselves with them and play up to them. That, after all, is always evident, just as a brilliant fake is evident alongside real gold. I think that the party's attitude toward the intelligentsia should, first and foremost, be serious and sincere. The party and the intelligentsia should not so much make friends as be together. If we want to raise our intellectual potential, enhance our prestige, and bring the masses along with us.

Let me take advantage of the opportunity to wish Communists and the entire Belorussian people, whose son I am, successes along the paths of socialist renewal and national revival.

Malofeyev Closing Speech to Belorussian CP Congress

91UN06524 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSIYA
in Russian 5 Dec 90 p 1

[Speech by A. A. Malofeyev at the closing of the Belorussian CP Congress held 28 November - 1 December 1990.]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! The 31st Belorussian Communist Party Congress is completing its work. Four days of heated political debate have passed. I have been at more than one congress and should say that there is much that distinguishes the present one. It reflects the spirit of the times, the attitudes of the party masses, and Communists' ardent desire to transform and consolidate the party and, through their deeds, to give it a new character and revive the people's trust.

The congress's main idea—and it was expressed very precisely and clearly—has been the need for the republic Communist Party's renewal and democratization. The delegates firmly declared that the party supports the socialist choice and came out in favor of the preservation and renewal of the USSR, and for cooperation and accord with all public political movements that adhere to a socialist orientation.

At the congress delegates also expressed Communists' will for the renewal of personnel in order that the leadership of party organizations at all levels may be joined by people who think in a nonstandard fashion and are capable of working in the spirit of the new requirements. A start on this has been made. Renewal should take place throughout the entire Belorussian Communist Party, but first of all in its Central Committee, and should proceed in all areas. And first of all it is necessary to strengthen the Central Committee's ties with the primary party organizations. That alone will make it possible to achieve the power of the party masses in actual practice.

At the congress there were numerous businesslike, interesting and exceptional speeches, some of which were very bold, and some of which were unfamiliar to our ears. But they were distinguished by freshness, novelty and the desire to change and break up routine approaches.

And the newly elected Central Committee and its working agencies are obliged to interpret every speech. Not a single thought, not a single constructive idea should remain unnoticed and fail to be carried out in concrete deeds.

The congress adopted important political documents and approved a conception of the Belorussian Communist Party Program that is the basis for the republic Communists' future program.

The four days of meeting made us all tolerant of dissent and confirmed once again that it is not from the position of a frontal attack, but from the position of common sense and extreme responsibility to the people and the party that we can, in an innovative fashion, resolve the questions of consolidation with public political tendencies that hold viewpoints different from ours.

That is my firm conviction. But at the same time we should protect our honor and dignity, and defend Communists against slander and attempts to blacken them. Granted, there are people in the party who are responsible for the past and the present. But that responsibility should be differentiated. And there are no grounds for smearing the entire party and all honest Communists, and we must stand up staunchly against that.

I am not calling on you for confrontation; I am calling on you to thoroughly analyze your actions and to cooperate with everyone who may create and is working to create a normal and healthy democratic atmosphere in the republic. Our people deserves that.

Its trust is the most valuable thing, which cannot be acquired for any money or any sort of decorations. We should remember this and direct all of our activities and all of our efforts to making the life of our people better.

We must think once again how to fit ourselves with our party platform into market relations, and how to give them the sort of content that will make it possible to

preserve the socialist choice, so that society will move not backward but only forward, getting a second wind and acquiring a democratic face, so that the individual will be free and live by laws.

Without discipline and responsibility, no democracy can exist. That is anarchy. I think that we will do everything possible so that our society will follow the democratic path.

The problems of the Union Treaty require serious reflection. Shortly the CPSU Central Committee plenum on this question will be held. It is already clear today that our state should be built on an entirely different basis, and that the republic should have its own face and its own duties to the union, as the union should have to us. It is precisely on such a mutual basis that we can build the most rational and sensible state that will serve people, and not itself.

It is hard to find words to express to you my feelings of tremendous gratitude for the trust that has been shown in me and the new Belorussian CP Central Committee. It gives us a new energy and a new understanding of pressing problems. On behalf of all who have been elected, permit me to once again express sincere thanks to you.

I am not accustomed to speaking high-flown words, but today I would like to assure you that I will do everything possible to justify this lofty trust through specific deeds. Of course, with your support, the support of Communists and all the republic's working people.

I want to wish you fruitful and constructive work in implementing the decisions made at the congress. The main thing is practical results, leading the country and the republic out of the severe political, economic and moral crisis. Allow me to wish you success along this path.

And finally, I have always been afraid of growing callous toward my party comrades-in-arms and my coworkers, especially in our difficult times. I am talking about the fact that when a person works with us, everyone needs him, and everyone shows interest in him. But when he leaves one or another office, we somehow lose all interest in him, as though he never existed. And in that connection, I return to a thought about Yefrem Yevseyevich Sokolov.

Right now a great deal of criticism is being leveled at the Central Committee and the party as a whole. Much of it is fair, but there is also a lot of it aimed simply at defaming its personnel and slinging mud at them. In the press all the arrows have been fired at the first secretary. But, of course, these arrows have been aimed not only at Sokolov, but primarily at the party itself. Although, of course, there are problems, there are shortcomings and difficulties.

Therefore, let me take advantage of the opportunity to say bluntly: we have quarreled and had disputes, but by

and large we have upheld the line that was necessary for the good of the cause. And for the fact that many positions have nonetheless been maintained in the republic, great credit goes to the republic Communist Party and to all of you, including Yefrem Yevseyevich. Permit me to express the most heartfelt gratitude to him and wish him all the best.

We should be exacting and demanding toward one another and, at the same time, mutually respectful. That is the basis for everything. All our relations must be built on that.

Need for Moldovan Party By-Laws Supported

91UN0697B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 5 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by V. Durnov: "Does the Communist Party of Moldova Need Its Own Rules?"]

[Text] Does the Communist Party of Moldova need its own rules? Each party meeting discussing the draft that has been published in the papers will most likely begin with this question. Indeed, Communists argue, what's the point? There are the CPSU Rules, after all! Or are we intending to quit the CPSU?

Such questions could not at other times have arisen even, just as the idea of individual rules for each communist party of a union republic could not have emerged. If we are a united party, and we have always considered it such, one set of rules really is what is needed. And any discussion of this subject is superfluous. I heard at one meeting the following comparison: Is it possible that in some army or another that individual regiments have drawn up their own manual? Such an army would be defeated in the first engagement!

Quite so. But let us not rush to conclusions, even preliminary ones. Let us think about it a little. And let us begin with the army comparison. Any comparison is lame, they say, and ours is lame in all legs.

First, this comparison cannot simply be rejected. Or considered inappropriate. We did, indeed, for a long time liken the party to an army and enthusiastically called Communists its fighters, raising them in the appropriate spirit. And established a discipline stricter than army discipline demanding unswerving fulfillment of the order of the commander, that is, a superior with sole responsibility. There was no hint even in the party of any equality, any democracy. But, second, the party is not in fact an army. It is not a means of repelling an attack on society from outside and of defense against an internal counterforce. It is, for all that, a political organization laying claim, to speak specifically about the CPSU, to the most appropriate expression of people's interests and their conversion into real social institutions guaranteeing their fulfillment. The party is a living organism in the body of society, in which other organisms, with other functions and assignments, live also. It is as such that it should be perceived.

How did we perceive the Communist Party of Moldova earlier? This is a question to which few people are paying any attention now because an answer to it was not sought earlier either. In name, it was a separate communist party of a Union republic within the USSR with its own constitution, anthem, coat of arms, and flag. But in reality? The sovereignty of this republic was quite provisional. And the Communist Party of Moldova, as an independent party, as a party proper, did not exist. It was a republic organization of the CPSU, an inseparable part and detachment thereof subordinate in iron fashion to its highest bodies. In terms of its functions, the Communist Party of Moldova was not in the least different from any oblast party organization anywhere in Russia or the Ukraine. And whoever took issue with this assertion would be wrong and unjust. Still, the former USSR was a unitary state, and the CPSU was a unitary party. It represented the backbone of the administrative command system, which kept in subordination and fear with the aid of organs of strict state suppression and ideological befuddlement one-sixth of the globe populated by hundreds of millions of people. Only let the reader not take umbrage at this plain-speaking. It is not meant in the least to injure the conscience of the millions of honest toilers used by the system in disregard of their wishes and understood as tiny cogs even. And if individual party organizations had the name of parties, this was a commonplace ruse of sham posturing designed to display the "reality" of the Stalin and Brezhnev constitutions. No more. We have all had our fill of these lies and long deception.

We now understand this, as we understand also the fact that the unitary state, granted all its might, represented shackles for the free development of the peoples. The rights of the nations and peoples and human rights were merely specified in our constitution, but were essentially outright deception. Just as the sovereignty of the republics with their rights to self-determination up to and including separation were a complete fiction. We would now like to send all this into the past. But this is not that easily done. The old still holds us by the arms and legs, which is why social processes are going so painfully and at times clumsily, dramatically and incomprehensibly even.

One thing is clear—all want to become independent, sovereign, self-determined peoples. And this cannot be prevented or resisted. The right of any people to sovereignty should be ensured without hindrance for it is the equivalent of the primary right of any individual—to life. Any people now wishes to determine its fate independently and they are trying to do so outside of the framework of the center (the majority without any notion even of countering it or parting from it) because it wishes to recognize itself and find its own place. Whence this at times spontaneous, inwardly unrecognized protest against the center and all its actions. All wish to become themselves. And everyone should be his own person. Structure of power.... Names of ministries.... School marks.... A new flag and coat of arms

reflecting the people's ancient traditions and attachments. This is its essence. Consequently, there is nothing wrong in all this, as it might seem to some people. These are entirely normal phenomena and the attributes of the revival of natural national self-awareness.

True, the euphoria of new sensations sometimes oversteps the mark. There is hardly anyone in whom the abbreviation KGB, for example, fails to evoke caution. There is too much in the way of murky business in the history of this Union department. But why should it be replaced by a department of national security? Whatever the case, there are in addition in Moldova, for example, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, and Jews, and they cannot be detached from our common concern or even formally denied protection of their security (or given an excuse to think thus). But such concerns may be handled calmly and without undue agitation that quite futilely ascends to the levels of tragedy.

Incidentally, the collisions and tension are emerging not only in the "national outlying areas," as was once said, they are very characteristic, to an even greater extent, perhaps, of Russia itself, the core of the former Union, around which we "united." It would seem to me, for example, that the process of the growth of national self-awareness, which has been under way for centuries, is more tense and tragic than in other republics, for it—Russia—has itself reached the end of its tether. The Russians themselves have finally come to sense their servile position in the former system, and this feeling is nurturing in them that same prejudice toward the center.

But now all republics are independent, sovereign states, each of which, as the draft union treaty says, "has the plenitude of state power on its territory." And this need not only to be understood and accepted but also sensed. The new Union will manifestly not be the former unitary state, but rather a union of independent, free, and equal states. This is the fundamental change in the conditions in which the communist parties of the Union republics are now operating. A sovereign republic means not only one's own flag, coat of arms, and anthem. It means the real right to decide and to enter into an alliance and with whom or not. These are inalienable attributes of power that any independent state possesses and with which it operates: an army (although we now need to think about who it is with whom we would be waging war), law enforcement authorities, one's own money (if the common rubles are unsatisfactory, to whom, however, would wooden rubles be satisfactory?) and so on and so forth. Could the Communists accomplish their tasks while remaining in a unitary union party? Many people will reply: Of course! Yes, it is possible, but if the main prescriptive, program documents of the unitary party reflect all the complexities of the conditions locally. Alas, demanding this of the CPSU Program and Rules is impossible.

Let us approach the question from another side. Let us ask: Why do people unite in parties at all? To realize their political interests. People join one party with some

interests, with others, another. Our common interest was for a long time communism. We now speak about this more modestly: the socialist choice of development, the communist focus. The very concept of communism has become blurred and unclear. Emphasizing the building thereof directly, we came to a dead end. But there is, nonetheless, reason to believe that the majority of members of the Communist Party living in Moldova have not said farewell to the ideals of communism conclusively, like the majority of members of the CPSU in general. Only now they see the more immediate task. They wish first to build a society capable of providing man with living conditions worthy of him. It is said, for example, that this will be a society of democratic socialism. But it is not a question of what it is called but of the fact that the starting (political, economic, demographic, and so forth) positions with different peoples and states of our Union and ways of achieving the goal are different. Consequently, people of one republic setting themselves the goal of achieving democratic (or some other) socialism should unite in the political organization that will determine the paths of this movement, proceeding from the specific singularities of the republic and its complexities and advantages. This is the desire of people adhering to a communist focus in other republics also. In both the goals and in the means of achieving them we all have much in common, almost 100 percent, as they say, apart from one thing—we are people of different national societies, and each one, there is no doubt about this, has particular features connected with history, culture, demography, traditions, and customs. Of which account should be taken not only by the program but also the rules.

So the Union of SSR is fundamentally changing its appearance and its essence. Abandoning its unitary character, it is becoming a union of equal and sovereign states. The authors of the draft new Union treaty rightly presuppose at the basis of the forces that will link the republics economic relations. They are undoubtedly far stronger than political chains and ropes. But then all the more necessary for each people is the perception of political independence, and it must be expressed, in the independence of the operating parties included.

Once again, at a meeting, I heard the following surprise conclusion: If there are rules of the Communist Party of Moldova, rules of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, of Belorussia, of Uzbekistan, and all the others, who will comply with the CPSU Rules? In response to this question, not asked out loud by many people, Communists intuitively look for arguments against the formulation of the Communist Party of Moldova's own rules. Because they have become accustomed to a unitary approach. And, indeed, how would things work? Would it be that no one would need the CPSU Rules? What would be the point of them? No, they would be needed but only in a different form.

The whole point is that in actual fact intraparty life has even now gone beyond the framework of the rules, which, in the main, have remained essentially the same

since the 1930's. These are Stalin's rules. A law of the life of the unitary party. They are not in this previous form suitable for the conditions in which the Communists now operate. What kind should they be? We need to think about this. First, let us get a feel for these new conditions. It is possible that an alliance of communist parties will not require uniform rules. Perhaps a concise document determining the **uniform ideological and organizational principles** on which the communist parties of the Union republics will structure themselves will be needed. Then the Central Committee and, presumably, a council of the party would not be needed either. M.S. Gorbachev contemplated this in a speech on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress.

With what are we left at the end of our deliberations? The SSR of Moldova should be an independent sovereign state, like any other republic intending to sign the new treaty of union. This is unequivocal. This is a reality. And Moldova is becoming such a state, albeit with difficulty, mistakes and tragedies even. It should be a state of Moldavians (let not those who wish to call themselves Romanians quibble over this word), that is, those who give it its name. This state could not be anywhere else—there simply is nowhere else (let the representatives of other nationalities not take offense at these words, they have to understand this). Consequently, the political organization professing communist ideas and operating on the territory of a sovereign state should be an **independent party** also. Relations with the CPSU (to be a part thereof or not) are an important problem, but in this case secondary and soluble without complications (according to the draft new Union treaty, citizens of a republic that joined it would automatically become citizens of the USSR). And if the Communist Party of Moldova is an independent party, it needs its own rules. Without its own rules it is not a party.

Moldovan Decree on Achieving Civil Harmony

*«UNION» 4 Kishinev, MOLDOVA SUUV, 4N1
in Russian 24 Nov 90 p 1*

[Decree: "Urgent Measures for the Achievement of Civil Harmony in the SSR of Moldova"]

[Text] For the purpose of achieving civil harmony in the republic and the preservation of its territorial integrity the SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] of Moldova Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To require the Conciliation Commission formed in accordance with the decree of the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet of 4 November 1990, to concentrate its activity to achieve civil harmony in the Republic, guided by this decree and the principles contained in the appeal of the republic parliament to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

That particular attention will be paid at this time to fulfillment of the decrees of the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet of 2 and 4 November 1990, in respect to the disbandment of the volunteer public order squads and workers' self-defense detachments and also other

similar formations not provided for by law, and the removal from the roads of checkpoints, protective structures, barriers, and so forth, and that the republic population be notified immediately of what has been done.

2. To declare a moratorium on clause 1 of the decree of the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet of 27 July 1990, "Material of the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet Commission for Study of the Requirements of People's Deputies of the USSR and Other Appeals Concerning the Formation of an Autonomous Gagauz National Group," for the period of activity of the Conciliation Commission.

3. That the SSR of Moldova Government form a department for nationality issues.

4. That upon the creation of organs of state power and state administration of all levels provision be made for the representation of citizens of all nationalities residing on the territory of the SSR of Moldova, in accordance with the ethnodemographic structure of the republic.

5. To form a parliamentary commission of deputies representing all regions of the republic to improve the mechanism of application of the SSR of Moldova law "The Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the SSR of Moldova" and a revision of the conditions of the certification of personnel.

6. To consider impermissible and punishable by law any unlawful activity presupposing the elimination of legally formed organs of state power and administration.

7. To accelerate enactment of the SSR of Moldova law "Guarantees of the Rights of National Groups Residing in the SSR of Moldova" and to create the optimum conditions for its execution.

8. When civil harmony has been achieved, to consider the question of an amnesty for those who participated in unlawful actions, except for persons who have committed serious crimes.

9. That the SSR of Moldova Government and the republic's law enforcement authorities will ensure the thorough investigation of instances of unlawful dismissal and the infringement of citizens' rights because of national affiliation and restore their civil rights.

10. That the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet and Government will adopt measures to ensure the safety of people's deputies of the SSR of Moldova throughout republic territory.

11. That this decree will take effect as of its adoption.

[Signed] A. Moshanu, chairman of the SSR of Moldova Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Kishinev, 14 November 1990

Moldovan Draft Law on Citizenship Analyzed

9JUN0747A Kishinev, SOVIETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 18 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by V. Tsurkan, director of the legal group of the Communist Party of Moldova Central Committee: "Better Not To Hurry"]

[Text] As was supposed, discussion during the first reading of the draft Law of the Moldovan SSR "On Moldovan SSR Citizenship" caused a stormy reaction both in the republic parliament and among the people. They waited a long time for it, some with great hopes and some with anxiety. Unquestionably, the extremely unstable and highly tense sociopolitical situation has left its imprint on everything as well. The text of the draft law, especially its individual articles, was interpreted ambiguously, including by people's deputies. Having an effect here were the secretiveness and hastiness of the new parliament in the preparation of drafts, which threatens to turn into a disease, the lack of clear and competent interpretation or explanation regarding the published draft, and the failure to fulfill the requirements of its own schedule on the timely submission to people's deputies (no later than 10 days) of draft laws and other documents that are to be reviewed.

Faced with the fact in this way, within just several days after the publication of the draft law in the press the people's deputies were compelled to begin discussing it in the Supreme Soviet. The two-day debate introduced a certain clarity, but a large number of questions remained, and I would like to express several thoughts in this connection.

First of all, about the correlation of the concept "citizen of the Moldovan SSR and citizen of the USSR," and the question of dual citizenship as a whole. The fact is that these problems are far from being identical. USSR citizenship, according to the legislation in effect, as a rule, is derived from citizenship of one or another Union republic (by virtue of the fact that it is a subject of the federation—the USSR) and constitutes, therefore, a specific form of dual citizenship. Incidentally, USSR citizenship is not a meaningless and formal makeweight for republic citizenship but a significant strengthening of the guarantees for ensuring individual rights. It guarantees us our equal rights (except for political) on the entire territory of the USSR, and beyond its borders—the protection and patronage, and the assistance, of the Soviet state in the form of diplomatic representation and consular and other establishments, which, taken individually, a republic is not in a position to guarantee.

The absence in the draft law of a reference to USSR citizenship is explained by the authors with the fact that it will be possible to resolve this problem only after the Union treaty is signed. Now, it is said, there are no grounds for such an entry, and it would be legally invalid just on the basis of its own law to permit its own citizen

to become a citizen of the USSR without its concurrence. This, it is said, is similar to interference in the internal affairs of another state.

One would like to hope that reasoning like this is the result of inadequate understanding and of error, and not the result of a deliberate confusion of the deputies and the population. Yes, indeed, the Moldovan SSR, as a sovereign republic, has the right in the final analysis to adopt its own Law on Citizenship. But it is unworthy of a rule-of-law state to pretend that other legislative acts on this score do not exist and that the point of departure is the draft in question. The law, in contrast to scientific work, must fix the procedure for regulating established social relations, and not forecast possible versions of their development. It is owing to this peculiarity of the law that society in great measure is guaranteed against instability, subjectivism, and voluntarism.

What do we have in the present situation? Today, in accordance with Article 31 of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the SSR of Moldova, a citizen of Moldova is simultaneously a citizen of the USSR, and this is also allowed us by the Law of the USSR "On Citizenship in the USSR" of 23 May 1990. True, the new Union treaty is not signed yet, but we also have not left the USSR system. In such a case, what are the legal grounds for rejecting a reference to USSR citizenship in the present draft law? There simply are none.

Two ways out of this situation are possible.

First—if the authors will not change their position, postpone the review of the draft law to a period after the resolution of all questions in connection with the signing of a new Union treaty;

Second—introduce an entry in the draft that, in accordance with the USSR Constitution and the Moldovan SSR Constitution, each citizen of the Moldovan SSR is a citizen of the USSR. Citizens of other Union republics cannot be citizens of the Moldovan SSR.

In addition, even if the obviously illegal proposal of the authors of the draft, which negates USSR citizenship, is put to a vote, it should be taken into account that it affects the aforementioned norm of the Constitution and requires a qualified (two-thirds) number of votes of the people's deputies.

As for Article 7 of the draft, it could then be formulated in the following way: "Citizenship of a foreign state of a Moldovan SSR citizen will not be recognized, unless otherwise provided for by pertinent international agreements."

The explanation of the authors of the draft law that a noncitizen of the Moldovan SSR will only not be able to enjoy political rights (to vote and be elected, to participate in a referendum, etc.) would be perceived with more confidence if it was fixed more precisely in appropriate norms. For these purposes, provision should be made in Article 9 of the draft that "citizens of other Union

republics, and persons without citizenship who live permanently on the territory of the Moldovan SSR, enjoy the same rights and freedoms as citizens of the Moldovan SSR, unless otherwise provided for by the laws of the Moldovan SSR."

The lion's share of questions and doubts fell to Article 1 of the draft "Belonging to Moldovan SSR Citizenship." As is known, two versions were proposed here. The press has already cited arguments against the first version as being intricate and politically questionable. The alternative, so-called "zero version" is unquestionably more democratic, corresponding to the generally recognized international legal principle of the priority of individual rights, and it is more just and acceptable under our conditions. According to it, those persons are citizens of the Moldovan SSR who on the day the present law goes into effect permanently live on the territory of the republic and have a continuous source of existence here (it would be better to say—permanent legal source of income), and also those who acquired Moldovan SSR citizenship in accordance with the present law. It appears that this alternative version could be supplemented by paragraph 4 from Article 1 of the draft, and Article 15 of the draft could then be excluded entirely.

In the event that the "zero" version is adopted, in order to realize their right to be a Moldovan SSR citizen, as is stipulated in Article 2 of the draft, all the aforementioned adults must submit an application in two years after the law goes into effect. Apparently the authors of the draft had in mind here through this application to conduct their own kind of registration of citizens of the Moldovan SSR and the issuance of new passports. But there should be a more specific presentation here of the mechanism of the official application itself, and it should be mentioned that no other conditions are required. As for the conditions for admittance to citizenship that are stipulated in Article 16 of the draft, in that case they must apply to persons who arrive for permanent residence in the republic after the present goes into effect. And this has to be stated in the text of this article.

A lot of doubts were expressed about the advisability of establishing compulsory knowledge of the state language as a condition for admittance to citizenship. It must be said that serious reasons underlie these doubts.

First, it is not clear who will determine this and how, without conducting mass examinations.

Second, the Law "On the Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Moldovan SSR" does not obligate everyone to know the state language, but only those officials and other persons who by the nature of their activity are in contact with and serve the population.

Third, this condition contradicts Part 1 of Article 16 of the draft, where it is stated that persons can be approved for Moldovan SSR citizenship, irrespective also of language.

Unfortunately, there are a lot of inaccuracies and ambiguities in other articles as well. Thus, additional work is required on the contents of Article 19 of the draft. Paragraphs 3-7 of this article contain such grounds for rejecting admittance to Moldovan SSR citizenship that are factually and legally associated with accusations of persons of the commitment of one crime or another. But in accordance with the well-known principle of presumption of innocence, a person can be judged guilty in the commission of a crime only through a court sentence, i.e., he is convicted, but all of this in such a case falls under Paragraph 1 of this same article.

Doubts are also raised by the adequacy of the grounds of the contents of Article 21 of the draft—"Renouncing Moldovan SSR Citizenship." The provision it contains that the president of the Moldovan SSR in exceptional cases can authorize the renunciation of Moldovan SSR citizenship contradicts Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights where it is absolutely specifically affirmed: "...No one can be arbitrarily deprived of his citizenship or the right to change his citizenship." In addition, it is hardly likely that anyone can name the objective criteria for determining whether the renunciation of Moldovan SSR citizenship on the part of a specific person in itself threatens the state or does not threaten the state (this is stipulated in the last part of the article in question).

These in large measure are the remarks and proposals on the draft law under review. While not claiming that they are complete or exclusive, nonetheless I would like to emphasize that the Law on Citizenship is too important and complex an act to adopt hastily or incidentally. It would be warranted here again and again to analyze each norm carefully, to give people the time and opportunity to express themselves, to coordinate it with international legal acts, and to forecast all the consequences of its application. In any case, our economy will not suffer because of the time it takes to adopt it, and haste can be much more damaging.

Central Asia

Shakhanov on 1986 Alma-Ata Incident, Historical Dishonesty

91US0103A Alma-Ata LENINSHIL ZHAS in Kazakh
29 Sep 90 pp 2-3

[Interview with Muqtar Shakhanov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR people's deputy, noted poet, recorded by Beybit Isabayev, chief of the LENINSHIL ZHAS Public Opinion and Law Education Division: "The Abuse of History Is Unforgivable"]

[Excerpts] [Isabayev:] —Mr. Shakhanov, before we get into our real topic of discussion, would you acquaint us with the work in general, goals and interests of the USSR Council of Ministers' commission set up to study the December 1986 incident? This is because the excessively

long time the commission took to do its work has disturbed the reading masses and the public a great deal.

[Shakhanov:]—The December Incident which took place in 1986 in Alma-Ata, and in some other oblasts of Kazakhstan, was in truth the first test of perestroika. The real character and meaning of the incident have been kept secret from the people until the present. From the very first days we have been unable to evaluate the incident properly. It is not only clumsy political error to interpret the December Incident as the general disorder of nationalist elements, drunks and narcotics users, but this lie has become attached to all, to an entire people. The application of such an evaluation, which has involuntarily impressed itself upon social consciousness, has been a factor in the abrupt worsening of relations between nationalities. The commission has had an influence upon countering this worsening, and took as its fundamental goal the establishment of the truth about the incident.

Although the uprising of Kazakh young people in December of 1986 was national in form, it was not a manifestation of nationalism. The discontent of the demonstrators was not directed at other peoples, among them at the Russian people.

The work of the commission was carried on during three periods. The people made known their lack of confidence at the composition of the commission formed through the June 1, 1989, resolution of the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. The reason was that among those appointed to the commission were official personages with direct interest in hiding the truth. After that, a group of USSR people's deputies was added to the commission and working and evaluative groups were formed. The second membership of the commission worked for little over a month in all. A decision was taken at a session (previously convened) of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet to dissolve the commission, since its work had been carried on in a one-sided manner, and was regarded as unjust. Thus, a small working group was left behind in its place. Only in January of 1990 was the commission reestablished with its present composition by public demand.

Some 200 highly knowledgeable specialists from every sector, jurists, sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, demographers, economists, lawyers, officials of the Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs, former KGB officials and representatives of the creative intelligentsia, and of social organizations, were enlisted for the working groups of the commission. Working as commission evaluators were members of the Latvian League on Human Rights and of the Kazakhstan Social Committee.

Some 2000 documents in 25 volumes were delivered to the commission and evaluated. Some 500 major crime and administrative cases were reviewed. Nearly 800 official persons were questioned, starting with responsible party and soviet officials, and the chiefs of police and legal organizations. Bureau members, secretaries of the

Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, and official persons from Moscow gave dispositions to the commission. The President of the Kazakh SSR sent an official letter. Materials of the local, republic, Union and international presses, and reports of foreign radio stations about the December Incident were examined and evaluated. Many films, photographs and videos were viewed. The Commission, in the process of its work, decided to review 98 criminal and 360 administrative cases.

In conclusion, the Commission did a great deal of work to evaluate carefully and justly the December Incident.

[Isabayev:] **Mukha, the way of truth has always been difficult. The December Incident is still another proof of this. As those three days of December recede more and more into the past, a cacophony of conflicting thoughts arises in the mind, and very many questions disturb us. One of them is: was the flare-up of the incident caused by the Moscow regime's sending of someone in from outside to head the republic at the time the V Plenum of the Central Committee Kazakhstan CP was being held?**

[Shakhanov:]—Many people like to second-guess the past. In my view, the decision of the plenum was like pouring oil on a fire. In a total of just 18 minutes, G.V. Kolbin, a man who had never before had anything to do with the republic, who knew Kazakhstan only on a map, whom we knew only according to the biography we read printed in newspapers and magazines, was chosen first secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee. Three persons spoke at the plenum: G.P. Rzymovskiy, CPSU Central Committee secretary, G.V. Kolbin and D.A. Qonayev. Kolbin was chosen unanimously to head the republic party organization. In spite of the fact that perestroika was not yet 20 months old, this was an example of the unprecedented interference of the central authority in the life of a union republic. If one examines history, this "method" has been repeated again and again, from the time of the foundation of the Soviet regime until the December Incident. At that time, 17 of 21 heads of the republic had been elected after administrative nomination from above. Kolbin was the eighteenth. In all just three heads had come from the local people. They were Mukhamedghaliyev, Shayakmetov and Qonayev. Something else which should be mentioned is that the post of first secretary of the republic CP had always been a regular stage in the promotion of those coming in from outside.

News of the Plenum decision was announced at 1500 on December 16 by the republic radio. On the evening of that day, the information that there was discontent among local people at the decision of the Plenum reached the city Internal Affairs Administration, and the State Security Committee. The decision of the Plenum became a hot topic of conversation above all among young people, students and workers with particular faith in the possibilities of perestroika and new thinking. From hindsight, these were the first sparks of the socio-political activism which we today demand of those young people. The people had ceased to bear patiently

and without complaint the socio-domestic and economic problems left unsolved for decades by the old administrative-bureaucratic system of the country, and its errors. The decision of the Plenum was the last hurrah of the system.

It is clear that the discontent affecting Kazakh young people in particular would sooner or later cease to be bottled up and would in fact find external expression. The only thing which was uncertain was what form this discontent would take and how it would be expressed.

[Isabayev:] —**Thus, the December Incident certainly went deeper than dissatisfaction with the decision of the Plenum in question which served as its backdrop.**

[Shakhanov:] To be sure, the Commission came to the decision in its conclusions that the Incident had objective social, economic, political and historical roots. Problems unresolved for centuries and intentionally complicated from time to time, and which had become elemental to the social life of the republic, flashed into the open in just one day. The role of the artificially enforced process of migration which had taken place since Czarist times to colonize the Kazakh steppe was great. The Stolypin Draft Law to Relocate the Peoples was the beginning of the process of turning over the rich Kazakh steppe to Russian peasants. General movement to the Kazakh steppe began in 1866. Total disregard for the needs of the local nationality became the corner stone of the Czarist Russian policy of colonialism. Unfortunately, there were those pushing this policy even after the October Revolution. According to the 1897 Census, Kazakhs comprised 80 percent of the people of that time occupying the present territories of the Kazakh SSR. They numbered 4,440,000. However, the total number of Kazakhs in 1926 barely reached four millions as a consequence of the 1916 national-liberation uprising and the Civil War. During the years 1930-1932, there were those fleeing the republic due to famine and forced collectivization. After further disasters the number of Kazakhs amounted to around 2.5 millions in 1939. Thus, Kazakhs formed only 38 percent of the population of their own republic. Adding the sacrifices of the Great Patriotic War, the percentage of Kazakhs in the Kazakh SSR fell to 30 percent in the 1959 Census. Some 3,950,000 persons left and took up residence outside the republic for various reasons during that 1930-1962 period. N.S. Khrushchev told the truth about this when he said (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA September 21, 1963): "Whereas the Czar was unable, with Czarist methods employed over the long term, to fill up the area with people, we have been able to achieve this through the use of Soviet methods." Why do we mention this? It is because our Russian cousins such as Vasilyeva, who has eaten the bread and drunk the water of Kazakhstan, without proper knowledge of the history of our republic, have made historical errors in their litigation of our honored land, which has had its masters and seekers since the time of Adam. It is clear that persons like Maqul Vasilyeva lack the knowledge and competence to research history. And recently it has become clear that

the statement of A. Solzhenitsyn in an article published in the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA that no part of Kazakhstan belongs to the Kazakhs does not help the reputation of the writer. It is also proper to show respect to a person who has long lived abroad, and who has been persecuted by the obsolete administrative-governmental system of our nation. However, the by-and-large total nonsense of the article must be laid at the door of the editors of the newspaper, not ashamed to publish them in a national publication. There is only one truth. Lies are not truth. No one gains honor from arguing with the truth. Today, at a time when the republic is striving for sovereignty, when nationality relations are still uncontrolled, no one needs such spleen.

The insertion of outsiders totally unaware of economic, cultural and national peculiarities into the leadership of the republic by outdated CPSU Central Committee, or better, Politburo administrative-dictatorial means was a political cause of the flaring up of the December Incident. The fundamental error of the central administration is that it considered Kazakhstan not as a sovereign republic but as a simple administrative-territorial region, and the independent republic CP as nothing more than a leading party unit. If the central administration had to do things in this way, it must be regarded as an expression of lack of confidence in the republic party organization, and in its people.

What kind of conclusions can we draw from these statements? The 1986 December Incident was not a matter of nationalism but of basic socio-political discontent of Kazakh young people towards the central administration. In truth it was the very first unofficial movement in the country carried on without permission by young people. The young people went out into the square to hold a peaceful demonstration to make clear why this was an unjust political decision forced on them by Moscow and to express their own disagreement with it.

[Isabayev:] —What position did the republic administration take towards the political discontent which began on the 17th of December?

[Shakhanov:] The December Incident was not evaluated properly from the very first days. Central publications and other mass media reported the incident as the disorder of extremist, nationalist, disorderly and drunken groups in Alma-Ata. The same evaluation of the incident was given in official party documents. Giving a wrong, hasty political evaluation to the incident, one which failed to get to the root of the problem, was a complete mistake on the part of the republic administration, and of the Central Committee CPSU. It resulted in a sudden worsening of republic nationality relations. At a time when perestroika was gaining a new impetus in the country, when real democracy and glasnost had still not yet penetrated our life, we only saw this as the obsolete administrative-bureaucratic apparatus using its usual pressure tactics. It was not considered necessary to come to a real agreement with the demonstrators, to discuss the plenum decision openly, or to explain it. The

political meaning of the Incident was distorted. The basic purpose in saying that it was the act of a group of rowdies, of drunks was as follows: to allow free use of the latest force, the military, technical and oppressive means to put down the demonstration. And it was so. But how did the incident begin? The first group of young people, about 200-300 persons, collected in the Brezhnev imeni Square between the hours of 7 and 8 in the morning on December 17. In their hands were placards expressing dissatisfaction with the decision of the Plenum of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Committee reported to the Central Committee on the assembling of the young people between approximately 9:00 and 9:30. In spite of the fact that the reasons why the young people had gone to the square were still unknown to the republic leadership, it was suggested, in agreement with the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan CP, that certain forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, internal troops and the State Security Committee be brought in to defend the square. And at 10:30, a Class I alert was declared for the Alma-Ata garrison, and streets leading into the city were closed. Thereby, two operational elements were made clear. First of all, that there existed plans prepared in advance to put down general disorder swiftly, and that these plans were to be put into effect without delay after a prearranged signal. Secondly, the beginning of the incident in this manner showed that the republic leadership misunderstood the assembly of persons in front of the Central Committee. The reasons why the young people had assembled and the character of the demonstration were not ascertained. The demonstration was regarded as a danger to the regime, one which had to be put down. The first reports about the demonstration, and about the measures which were being taken, were quickly delivered to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR State Security Committee and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Subsequently, reports were made every hour and every half-hour to the State Security Committee. In accordance with arrangements made with the CPSU Central Committee, Kolbin maintained his own communications. The contents of these communications are unknown to the Commission. The first report discussing the Incident in Alma-Ata was provided Moscow at 6:00 in the evening on December 17. V.M. Miroshnik, chairman of the Kazakh SSR State Security Committee, reported to V.M. Chebrikov, chairman of the USSR State Security Committee. To the question of the Commission, "Who advised you in evaluating the situation in order to make a political decision?", Miroshnik answered, "No one needed to advise Kolbin who had accumulated experience of this sort in Georgia." However, according to the testimony of all those official persons questioned, Kolbin, due to the fact that he was unfamiliar with the situation in the republic during the first half of December 17, relied on the advice of O.S. Miroshkhin, second secretary of the Central Committee, G. N. Knyazev, republic internal affairs minister, and V.M. Miroshnik in his evaluations, and in his decisions and conclusions. From the evening of December 18, M.S. Solomentsev took all political and

general authority into his hands. Oral and written reports of these individuals took as their foundation the December 18, 1986, resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and approved in them all acts of the republic leadership.

Misrepresentation of the situation in this way to the central authority resulted in the decision to bring in special units of internal affairs troops from other areas. USSR Minister of Internal Affairs A.V. Vlasov, in agreement with the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, issued an order to move armed forces to Alma-Ata from eight cities of our nation. It has been stated in this regard that calling in armed forces from outside was at the request of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee Buro. However, in fact, from 1130 to 1400 on December 17 all Buro members were among the demonstrators who had taken to the streets. At that time there had been no violation of social order whatever.

Based on this evaluation, and the request drawn up in the name of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee Buro, the question of imposing military law in Alma-Ata, and of employing military units there was discussed in Moscow. In spite of the complete opposition of V.N. Lobov, commander of the Central Asia Military Okrug, to the introduction of troops, G.V. Kolbin made repeated requests to the USSR Ministry of Defense, and convinced the ministry that he could not restore the situation without troops. The republic minister of internal affairs G.N. Knyazev commanded a staff to oversee decisive use of forces of the Alma-Ata garrison when public order was violated. At his orders, operational groups of the city Internal Affairs Administration, and of internal affairs divisions of Kalinin, Sovet and Frunze rayons were mobilized. The square was cordoned off by the highway patrol service regiment, a special police battalion and other forces.

The demonstration was at first peaceful in nature. Testimony given in answers to the Commission, and official leaders themselves were later unable to deny this. The young people were expressing their dissatisfaction with the election of G.V. Kolbin to the republic leadership, and demanding that D.A. Kunayev appear before the people. Complaints about living standards, employment, difficulty in finding housing, and restrictions in the use of the Kazakh language were made known. These demands found expression in placards held in their hands written in the Kazakh and Russian languages. Their content was of this sort: "No ethnic group should be favored!", "We demand that Leninist principles be respected in ethnic relations!", "Long live Leninist ideals!", "To each republic its own leadership!", "Long live Kazakhstan!" The young people raised the portrait of Lenin and sang folksongs. They were not mobilized against other peoples, or against the government, and they were unarmed. Carrying on discussion among them were party and Komsomol officials, political officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, deans and deacons of higher educational institutions. According to all the

evidence the number of demonstrators was from 1200-1400 up to 5000 during the afternoon. There was an order preventing anyone from going to or leaving the square. Those caught within police lines helped those coming from outside. Police lines were broken several times and the clashes took place. The young people demanded that police lines be removed.

From 1500 to 1800, no information was available to the two sides at all. Members of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee Politburo took the podium but were unsuccessful in calling upon the young people to disperse. Those going to the meeting spoke, but they were later denied permission to take the podium. The demonstrators threw snow and iceballs at those on the podium, and at the soldiers. Altercations began among them. Police officers attempted to remove activists by force from among the demonstrators, but the young people resisted and refused to give them up. At 1700, at the request of V.M. Miroshnik, chairman of the Kazakh SSR State Security Committee, and ordered by V.M. Chebrikov, chairman of the USSR State Security Committee, 600-man special detachments of the USSR State Security Committee and the Alma-Ata Higher Command Border Troops School were brought into the square. At 1930, M.S. Solomentsev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, responsible officials Ye.Z. Razumov, and N.F. Mishchenko, USSR First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs B.K. Yelisev and others came to Alma-Ata.

The staff headed by B.K. Yelisev took charge of the operation of dispersing the demonstrators. The political decisions were, however, taken by Kolbin and CPSU Central Committee representatives Razumov and Mishchenko. F. Bobkov, V. Miroshnik and G. Knyazev had investigated and evaluated the situation.

At 1800 on December 17, the local leadership took counsel with Kolbin, Miroshkhin, Miroshnik and Knyazev on the decision to disperse the demonstrators, with the approval of the central authorities. Knyazev gave the order to disperse and disperse the demonstrators. From this moment, general disorder began in Alma-Ata.

During the second operation to clear those who had entered the square, fire trucks were brought in at the order of Yelisev. As a result, several were burned, and tens of persons received various wounds.

The third basic operation to clear the demonstrators lasted from 2330 to 2400 on the evening of December 17. It was characterized by its abruptness and severity. On this occasion heavy shovels and rubber clubs were used against the demonstrators, including women and children. Hundreds were wounded.

The plans for the special operation were called "metel-1986." They were drawn up on the basis of Order No. 0385 of the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs. In Kazakhstan these plans were carried out just during the days of the December Incident. Later, at the orders of individual leading officials of the Kazakh SSR Ministry

of Internal Affairs, the plans were destroyed as "documents without practical meaning." The real reason for doing this was to remove responsibility from those carrying out the operation. However, the Commission was able to restore the operational plans according to a 1988 copy, and everything which happened during the dispersal of the demonstrators, and investigate them. Through these plans, all the methods and actions of law organizations, the police and military forces to suppress and drive away the demonstrators became known to the Commission. The "Metel" Plans utilized in 1986 in Alma-Ata were later carried out in Baku, Yerevan and Tbilisi. These "Metel" Plans were not just an operation to disperse demonstrators. They were a broad deception carefully thought out with direct connection to links in political, law enforcement, penal, ideological and other administrative-bureaucratic systems. In 1986 in Alma-Ata, the following peculiarities of the plan were revealed. Forces were quickly brought to the place where the incident took place and decisions were taken quickly. There was strict central command of the leaderships of all divisions involved. The demonstration was suppressed mercilessly. After that, the incident was distorted along desired lines as criminal, nationalist, or against perestroika. Fictitious reports were given the people, the causes of the incident were hidden and various subterfuges were employed. But the truth of whatever has been long hidden comes to the surface. Thus, since it was impossible to keep the incident secret according to this plan, a conference of party and enterprise activists was summoned on the evening of December 18 and a distorted statement was released about the incident. An evaluation of the incident as a manifestation of nationalism, hiding the political character of the acts of "anti-social, criminal elements, drunks and narcotics addicts," was provided to representatives of social organizations, and heads of industries.

The false report distorting the character of the incident was put out by Kolbin, Bobkov and Razumov. They wrote in a secret telegram sent to the central apparatus on December 18: "The disturbance raised nationalist slogans from the morning of December 17...As it went on, representatives of other nationalities were harmed. Voices began to be raised insulting the reputations of the leaderships of the CPSU Central Committee, and of the Kazakhstan CP." Kolbin reported on 23 December to an expanded Buro session of the Central Committee with the participation of oblast party committee and ideological services chiefs: "More than half of those arrested were drunks and narcotics users. It is known that they later brought liquor to the square and drank it to warm up." The Commission looked into this question carefully but could find no proof whatever.

[Isabayev:]—What role did former members of the Central Committee Buro play in evaluating the incident, making decisions in connection with it, and in questions relating to the December Incident in general?

[Shakhanov:]—The Commission came to the following conclusions, after carefully examining available attestations and testimony. In this connection, we should start with two issues. First, the group headed by newly chosen republic party first secretary G.V. Kolbin, representatives of the CPSU Central Committee from Moscow, and the heads of law enforcement organizations decided all-important political questions in this matter without taking council with Buro members, apart from them, and without their agreement. Kazakh SSR President N.A. Nazarbayev wrote about this in an official letter sent to the Commission: "From the beginning of the incident until the end, representatives of the local republic leadership were deprived of all possibilities for having any influence at all on the course of events. In truth, all decisions, including the decision to use Ministry of Internal Affairs troops to suppress the demonstration, were taken within the closed cabinet of G.V. Kolbin. The reason why representatives from Moscow completely prevented us from exercising any control over what was going on in the square was due to the suspicion that we would do something to take advantage of the mood of the masses and to use the incident for our own purposes. Notes from the demonstrators suggesting the names of Ye.P. Awyelbekov, first secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, L.P. Demidenko, O.S. Miroshkhin, N.B. Morozov, S.M. Mugashev, and N.A. Nazarbayev greatly disturbed them. Names mentioned showed that the young people were not completely against representatives of the Russian nationality entering into the republic leadership."

Among the local leadership, only Miroshnik and Knyazev took part in reviewing and evaluating the situation, and in making decisions. This lack of confidence in the local leadership did not change later. G.V. Kolbin was the first to suggest to Moscow, to the heads of the government, that N.A. Nazarbayev be relieved of his post as chairman of the republic Council of Ministers.

[Isabayev:]—A logical question arises at this point. Were there ways of resolving this kind of incident without making it excessively complicated, and without bloodshed? Why was the republic leadership unable to find common ground with the demonstrators, unable to come to an agreement?

[Shakhanov:]—It would seem that a good answer should first be given by the other side. There are not a few examples in history, even when great wars have broken out, when intelligent, concerned persons from the two sides have sat down to conduct purposeful discussions.

To be sure, the republic leadership, ignorant of the reason why the young people had assembled in the square, seemed to be making an effort to carry on a dialogue with the demonstrators as they urgently summoned police units and military forces. But their efforts yielded no results. And why? The reason is that those taking the podium spoke in Kazakh. Since the two sides were speaking different languages, they could not understand one another. The government officials who

appeared before the demonstrators repeatedly reminded them that a demonstration of that kind made no sense, and was illegal, and demanded that they disperse. No one in the Central Committee, or in other "quiet" centers, saw the need to make the representatives of the demonstrators understand the situation. Analysis of the decision of the Central Committee Plenum was an internal party matter, and could not be done. The demonstrators did not have the right to demand explanation of a political decision, or to speak for the people. The old apparatus, which had become utterly used to the old system of control and government over the decades, had no desire to understand the political demands of young people who had come forward on the heels of perestroika. Under such circumstances, since they knew no specific measures for working with the people, the leadership could only employ the "tried and true" old method, and suppress the demonstration by force.

In short, it was revealed in December of 1986 that the old administrative, bureaucratic apparatus, which has now disappeared from the political arena, was still very strong. And individual representatives of this political system failed in the first real test of perestroika imposed from above. The basis for this was provided by those "above" themselves.

[Isabayev:] —Another critical factor observed during the December Incident was the lack of trust between the ethnic groups. When we are seized and arrested in the hands of the people's police, is not one people being opposed to another?

[Shakhanov:] It would not be too much to say that the clumsiness of the leadership at that time was one of the errors which subsequently created major problems for the life of the republic. Kolbin thought up the idea of putting the workers into the streets of the city. That decision was taken in the meeting with heads of the party and of enterprises on December, at his direct suggestion. M. Mengdibayev and G. Shuliko were responsible for the people's police. They were actively assisted by A. Khmyzov, at that time division chief of the city party committee, Yu. Yezhkov, first secretary of the Moskva Rayon party committee, and Yu. Meshcheryakov, first secretary of the Oktyabr Rayon party Committee. Party meetings were held during the night at city industrial establishments, factories and organizations, and at dawn on December 18, the first "people's policemen" armed with iron cutters, chains and crowbars were brought in. These weapons were manufactured in city factories and were distributed to city and rayon party committees. This fact has been proven completely by many witnesses called before the commission. For example, S. Zlotnikov, worker in the Alma-Ata Heavy Machinery Factory has written:

"Early on the morning of December 18, we workers were called upon to defend the city party committee. From 2000 in the evening, we were armed with chains and pieces of cable... Who has the right to arm and direct one people against another? Clubs and crowbars are handed

out and collected again. But are not the wounds inflicted between the nationalities long lasting?"

The people's policemen were not charged with protecting post offices, telegraph stations, banks and stores. They were essentially brought in to protect party committee facilities, to cordon off Brezhnev Square, and the streets. Kolbin reported to the expanded Bureau session of the Central Committee: "An assault was being made on the Alma-Ata City Party Committee. Needless to say, we had to suppress it."

What he said in no way corresponded to reality. No one had penetrated to the facilities of the city party committee. In this regard, what Kolbin said runs counter to the testimony of all those members of the people's police asked, and of others.

While Kolbin said that the people's police should be drawn from the ranks of the local nationality, this could not be carried out due to the national composition of the workers and employees of the city. In his answer given to the Commission, S.K. Abdirakhmanov, first deputy chair of the Kazakh SSR State Security Committee, said that the decision to send into the streets during the day of December 18 thousands of workers (mostly Russian) armed with irons, clubs and sticks went from V. Miroshnik to G. Kolbin, and others. However, no one was worried about the disturbance that this would create. As a result, the conflict between demonstrators and the people's police took the form of a race riot. As Miroshkhin has said, the "hunting of people" began during the day of December 18. However, this hunt truly went on a nationality basis. The republic leadership was immediately able to distort absolutely clear circumstances in order to hide the fact that everyone, demonstrators, persons walking down the street, persons around residence halls and near home, was beaten. Pictures were taken of those weapons made for the people's police. These were later shown to the masses and to the leaderships as "weapons" of the demonstrators when investigations were carried out.

Unfortunately, the people of the republic have now begun to understand the truth of what took place during the three days of the December Incident. But there is not a little which we still do not understand.

[Isabayev:] —It has been written that Q. Rysqulbekov, who was first sentenced to be shot but later had his sentence reduced to 20 years' imprisonment, killed himself in prison. Did the Commission do anything about Q. Rysqulbekov?

[Shakhanov:]—According to official information, it is known that Q. Rysqulbekov was accused of the death of Savitskiy. The Commission, after careful investigation, came to the conclusion that Rysqulbekov's accusation of murder was from the first a falsification on the part of the investigating organs. Rysqulbekov refused to the end to confess to the killing, and said that he was somewhere else when the crime took place. Testimonies of witnesses appearing before the Commission have indicated that

Rysqulbekov was somewhere else entirely when Savitskiy's accident took place. The Criminal Affairs Judges Court of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court, in spite of the fact that there were considerable deficiencies in the way the investigation was carried out, and in spite of violation of general court procedures, and without sufficient evidence, convicted Rysqulbekov of the crime on June 16, 1987, and condemned him to death.

Q. Rysqulbekov appealed to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court and to the USSR Supreme Court. But his appeals had no effect. The courts were brazen in confirming that his guilt had been completely proven, and that he had received the appropriate punishment.

By an April 28, 1988, order of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Q. Rysqulbekov was shown mercy, and his punishment reduced from death to 20 years' imprisonment.

The officials of the State Security Committee who first reported on the suicide of Q. Rysqulbekov in prison refused to give permission for his body to be taken to his village and returned to his relatives. Why? In any case, they wrote and sent a false telegram explaining why they could not return the body to Rysqulbekov's relatives. Rysqulbekov's body remains in Semey till the present day. I think that the Commission must carefully investigate the facts of the case again in the future.

[Isabayev:]—**What were the Commission's views about the facts and figures in official documents, and published in the press, about the December Incident in general?**

[Shakhanov:]—According to official evidence, the number of those arrested during the days of the incident was 2401. At first glance, this figure is not even close to reality. According to evidence and specific information in the hands of the Commission, the number of those arrested was 8515. Most of them were arrested illegally, without any cause whatever. Some 5000 persons were loaded into buses and taken out and thrown into the snow and ice near the settlements of Kamenka and Fabrichnyy, located outside the city. It was reported to the Commission by the Kazakh SSR Procurator's Office that 342 police officers, 196 soldiers and 365 citizens, a total of 885 persons, received some kinds of wounds during the December Incident. Later, in a statement of first deputy Minister of Internal Affairs E. Basarov made at the request of the Commission, the number of those wounded was established at 1214 persons, including 773 police officers and soldiers and 441 citizens.

However, it has been determined that the number of citizens who were wounded was understated in Commission evidence.

[Isabayev:]—**Mukha! What about the activities of procurator, court and administrative organs in connection with the incident?**

[Shakhanov:] The incorrect evaluation of the December Incident from the very beginning, its acceptance as a

manifestation of nationalism, became the basis for severely punishing the local nationality youth who demonstrated. Already on December 17, 1986, a special order was given by Kazakh SSR Procurator Gh. Yelemesov regarding the establishment of a special investigations group to investigate criminal activities in connection with the general disorder. The Investigations Group Administration was headed by republic deputy procurator A. Myznikov. V. Voltynov, chief of the Research Division of the Kazakh SSR Procurator's Office was chosen as his deputy. Some 98 competent investigators from procurators' offices, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the State Security Committee became part of the group. SSR Deputy Chief Procurator O. Soroka and Assistant Chief Procurator Strelniko were in charge and set policy. We know from official press reports that 99 persons were put on trial for crimes committed during the December Incident. Of them, some 80 persons were accused of acts violating nationality, and racial equality, or for giving rise to general disorder. They were tried according to articles 60 and 65 of the Kazakh SSR Criminal Code. In a judgment of Kazakh SSR Deputy Procurator A. Myznikov on inciting criminal activities, the actions of all those at a meeting were accused of fomenting inter-nationality animosity in connection with disorder. However, the actions of law enforcement and government organs were regarded as being carried out to maintain law and order.

[Isabayev:]—**Elder brother Muqtar, in your view, when the legal organs crushed the law under their feet by accusing all the demonstrators of crimes, without any regard whatever to their guilt or innocence, were there not those who raised their heads to say: "Look my elder brother. They do not treat us as people. Where is justice?"**

[Shakhanov:] There was no need to push our faces into the dirt. If all of those who were members and heads of courts, and officials of investigatory organizations are now ashamed to have made the very young weep by finding them guilty, they must ask forgiveness from those young people, and from the people. However, among them there are those who cannot ignore the strains to their reputation. For example, at the orders of K. Zhunisov, member of the Alma-Ata City Court, A. Shabarov and K. Yesimbayev were accused of crimes, and additional investigations were carried out. This was because the head of the court was unable to see that there was no evidence whatever for bringing them to trial again.

[Isabayev:]—**It is an inevitable fact that the political and social activism of the young will find expression in the national consciousness. However, why is it that the actions of those who went out into Brezhnev Square in 1986 are evaluated as a race riot, and in time the entire Kazakh people have been smeared with the label nationalist?**

[Shakhanov:] Kazakhstan was a source of pride for the entire nation, as an example of the friendship of the peoples. The December Incident overturned this idea entirely. Likewise, with the direct participation of the older leadership, the label "Kazakh Nationalism" was

pinned on Kazakhstan. Various measures have been employed to prove this, and a heated campaign of accusation has been begun. Some persons have even gone so far as to nit-pick by chasing percentages, and counting the number of Kazakhs among leading workers of higher education and administrative organizations. Legal organizations have reduced the numbers of Kazakhs they hire.

For example, whereas the number of ethnic Kazakhs among graduates in the Karaganda Higher Police School was 61 percent of total graduates in 1986, the figure fell to 35.3 percent in 1987, and was reduced to 27.5 percent in 1988. In 1987 a sign was put up in front of the Chimkent Oblast Internal Affairs Administration saying: "Kazakhs are not hired by internal affairs organizations."

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